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Re: [tor-bugs] #5565 [Tor Relay]: MyFamily should provide an alternate non-idhex subscription mechanism



#5565: MyFamily should provide an alternate non-idhex subscription mechanism
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry    |          Owner:                    
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay    |        Version:                    
 Keywords:               |         Parent:  #5563             
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:3 mikeperry]:
 > Yeah, I guess before we even get to the proposal point: Can anyone think
 of any objections to doing this as KISS as possible, and making OurFamily
 an arbitrary 256bit identifier or something similar?

 The design is "A relay, if it wants, can set a uuid in its descriptor. Any
 set of relays that pick the same uuid will never have more than one from
 the set appear in the same path"?

 So if Moritz runs five fast relays, together making up 10% of the network
 by bandwidth, and puts them all in the same family, the adversary can set
 up a relay and tell clients "if you ever pick me, be sure never to pick
 any of Moritz's nodes in that path"? I don't have a specific attack in
 mind yet, but that sort of probability distribution shift makes me
 nervous. My first thought would be to argue for ditching the family
 concept rather than introducing this new approach and then waiting for
 somebody to flesh out the attack.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5565#comment:12>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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