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Re: [tor-bugs] #10969 [Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint

#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  asn      |      Owner:
         Type:  task     |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guards,
Actual Points:           |  026-triaged-1
       Points:           |  Parent ID:  #11480
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Not using guards (setting {{{UseEntryGuards 0}}}) actually means you'll
 pick a new entry node for every circuit. This will greatly reduce the
 amount of time it takes for you to eventually pick a malicious relay as an
 entry node. If you're concerned about this issue but aren't using one of
 the tools linked above, a better option (than {{{UseEntryGuards 0}}}) is
 to leave UseEntryGuards enabled (the default) but stop tor and nuke your
 state file to get a new set of guards whenever you physically relocate.

 Is there any progress on fixing this properly? Or are you waiting to see
 some XKEYSCORE fingerprints showing that this linkable information is
 actually being linked?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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