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Re: [tor-bugs] #16723 [Tor]: randomize HH:MM in AccountingStart for a more even distribution of hibernating relay resources



#16723: randomize HH:MM in AccountingStart for a more even distribution of
hibernating relay resources
-----------------------------+-------------------------------
     Reporter:  cypherpunks  |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_information
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+-------------------------------

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:14 cypherpunks]:
 > When using the suggested method (random value generated by the relay
 once) then this problem does not occur, right?

 No, I think the problem can still occur. If my provider charges me for
 going over my quota on a given day (midnight to midnight), but from Tor's
 perspective there are two intervals that overlap with that day, then I
 could end up spending most of my bandwidth in the later half of the first
 interval, and most of it in the early half of the second interval, and now
 I spent twice as much as I wanted to on the day.

 In sum, letting operators know that they can change the 00:00 is a fine
 thought, if they do it with knowledge of what's going on inside Tor.

 Seems to me that the better answer is to make Tor better at predicting how
 much bandwidth it will take on a day, so it can start up at more random
 times.

 Do we think there are bugs in the current prediction algorithm, or is it
 just the case that relays often don't have any data from the previous day?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16723#comment:15>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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