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Re: [tor-bugs] #10239 [BridgeDB]: Payment for bridges (and effects this would have)



#10239: Payment for bridges (and effects this would have)
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     Reporter:  tmp       |      Owner:
         Type:  project   |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal    |  Milestone:
    Component:  BridgeDB  |    Version:
   Resolution:            |   Keywords:
Actual Points:            |  Parent ID:
       Points:            |
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Comment (by tmp):

 I viewed this video some time ago: "How governments have tried to block
 Tor [28C3]" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwMr8Xl7JMQ (Flash, sorry)

 From what I understood, there are some 'sensitive' times when many Chinese
 state people are breaking captcha's etc, to block as many bridges as
 possible.
 So it sounds like there might be quite a population that could benefit
 from this (when obfs3 is used and the only way to block is to request a
 bridge).
 There are only so many bridges that are donated when you would like to
 have a million people using these. That can be improved.

 So for your main question "What is the appeal of this?":
 Suppose obfs3 or 4 won't be distinguishable from ssl. The only mechanism
 that is left to block these bridges is to request as many as possible, and
 filter them. However, every request spawns a new bridge and will therefore
 not block anything.

 Will it benefit providers? Well, if it works at scale then there should be
 competition (and it is a competitive industry), so it won't fill their
 pockets.

 So the main question is whether there is sufficient demand for it. Maybe
 that someone with on-the-ground knowledge can tell us.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10239#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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