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[tor-bugs] #18351 [Tor]: Relay directory failures and logging are too aggressive



#18351: Relay directory failures and logging are too aggressive
------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  sysrqb  |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:  Tor: unspecified
     Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |    Sponsor:
------------------------+--------------------------------
 As mentioned in #18348, when a relay exhausts the available directory
 authorities, it now produces the below warning. It seems there are three
 points to consider when taken in the context of a relay:
 1) The actual log message is not correct, this completely unrelated to the
 firewall/reachability logic
 2) I'm not certain, but I believe this is likely a normal situation on the
 network
 3) Logging this at warn seems overly aggressive for something a user can't
 control

 1) and 2) are actually the same point. See the attached debug log extract
 (including some additional messages I added). Nearly all the dir auths are
 marked as down due to 304 responses. Should tor be less aggressive about
 avoiding a directory authority after a 304? I worry, if this is normal
 behavior, then the network's load is not be distributed among all the
 directories. It seems like they're being picked off, one-by-one.
 Especially when this is in the logs - unless I'm reading it wrong they're
 identical requests despite the first one succeeding (possibly another
 bug?):

 {{{
 --
 Feb 20 05:26:37.000 [info] directory_send_command: Downloading consensus
 from 128.31.0.39:9131 using /tor/status-vote/current/consensus-
 microdesc/0232AF+14C131+23D15D+49015F+805509+D586D1+E8A9C4+ED03BB+EFCBE7.z
 Feb 20 05:26:39.000 [debug] connection_dir_client_reached_eof: Received
 response from directory server '128.31.0.39:9131': 200 "OK" (purpose: 14)
 --
 Feb 20 05:27:37.000 [info] directory_send_command: Downloading consensus
 from 131.188.40.189 using /tor/status-vote/current/consensus-
 microdesc/0232AF+14C131+23D15D+49015F+805509+D586D1+E8A9C4+ED03BB+EFCBE7.z
 Feb 20 05:27:38.000 [debug] connection_dir_client_reached_eof: Received
 response from directory server '131.188.40.189:80': 304 "Not modified"
 (purpose: 14)
 Feb 20 05:29:37.000 [info] directory_send_command: Downloading consensus
 from 199.254.238.52 using /tor/status-vote/current/consensus-
 microdesc/0232AF+14C131+23D15D+49015F+805509+D586D1+E8A9C4+ED03BB+EFCBE7.z
 Feb 20 05:29:41.000 [debug] connection_dir_client_reached_eof: Received
 response from directory server '199.254.238.52:80': 304 "Not modified"
 (purpose: 14)
 }}}

 In the attached log, router_set_status() records when a node is marked
 down. The preceeding lines should say why.
 router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl() records which nodes we disqualified
 when we want to send a new request.


 Scary backtrace:

 {{{
 [warn] router_picked_poor_directory_log: Bug: Firewall denied all OR and
 Dir addresses for all relays when searching for a directory. (on Tor
 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug: Node search initiated by. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-
 dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x1157e08 <log_backtrace+0x48> at /usr/local/bin/tor (on
 Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10af86b <hid_serv_responsible_for_desc_id+0xdeb> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10a6a86 <router_pick_trusteddirserver+0x76> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x1126183 <directory_get_from_dirserver+0x293> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10ad45a <launch_descriptor_downloads+0x4ba> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10ad21a <launch_descriptor_downloads+0x27a> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10adb6b
 <update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads+0x6cb> at /usr/local/bin/tor
 (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10ac7f6 <update_all_descriptor_downloads+0x66> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x10602c8 <directory_info_has_arrived+0x48> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x1128890 <connection_dir_reached_eof+0x1160> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x1107f5b <connection_handle_read+0xb3b> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x105f044 <connection_add_impl+0x214> at
 /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x801aa538e <event_base_loop+0x81e> at
 /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.0.so.5 (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev
 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x1060cc5 <do_main_loop+0x5c5> at /usr/local/bin/tor (on
 Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x1062fcf <tor_main+0xdf> at /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor
 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x105ed49 <main+0x19> at /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor
 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 [warn] Bug:     0x105ec41 <_start+0x1a1> at /usr/local/bin/tor (on Tor
 0.2.8.1-alpha-dev 1f679d4ae11cd976)
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18351>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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