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Re: [tor-bugs] #21284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort



#21284: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort
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 Reporter:  teor                  |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement           |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                |      Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor          |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                        |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                        |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by s7r):

 I fully agree with asn - a lot of complications for a very weird and rare
 use case.

 Wonder why would someone really want this... This kind of like wanting to
 take a shower without getting wet. While there are obvious, plenty,
 demanded use cases for RSOS (very happy to have it), I can't see at least
 one for downloading files non-anonymously over Tor.

 Let's think if this option would not be actually useless and/or impossible
 to implement before further discussing use cases. It's unclear to me:

 - a Tor instance running a single onion service is not anonymous because
 it only builds single hop circuits (to introduction points and rendezvous
 relays) except for HSDirs when uploading descriptors when normal 3 hop
 circuits are used. In this case, SocksPort circuits can also be regular, 3
 hop, so will this truly be 100% non anonymous? It might affect anonymity
 in unknown ways, but we don't know for sure.

 - other way around, if the SocksPort circuits are single hop because this
 is the only way single hop onion services can also work on the same Tor
 instance, how will exiting even work since Exit relays do not allow exit
 traffic on single hop circuits. We have `AllowSingleHopExits 0` default on
 relay side, so all Exit relays will not allow it. Even if there were few
 configured to allow it, on the client side we have `ExcludeSingleHopRelays
 1` default and also a `AllowSingleHopCircuits 0` but I guess RSOS
 overwrites these in order to work.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21284#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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