[tor-bugs] #6470 [Analysis]: distinguishing between (non-) hidden service hosters, too few/much open circuits

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <torproject-admin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#6470: distinguishing between (non-) hidden service hosters, too few/much open
circuits
----------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  proper    |          Owner:     
     Type:  task      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal    |      Milestone:     
Component:  Analysis  |        Version:     
 Keywords:            |         Parent:     
   Points:            |   Actualpoints:     
----------------------+-----------------------------------------------------
 For Internet Service Providers it's too easy to find who hosts a hidden
 service and who doesn't.

 For people connecting to the public Tor network:
  * Tor users have X open circuits after Tor started.
  * Hosters of hidden services have much more open circuits after Tor
 started. In my tests it were mostly X*3 open circuits.
  * It's trivial for ISPs to distinguish between non-hidden-services and
 regular Tor users.
  * That analysis combined with another attack, such as Murdoch's clock
 skew attack can de-anonymize Tor hidden service hosters.

 For people connecting to (obfuscated) bridges:
  * Same as above but depends on the ability of the ISP to detect
 connections to the Tor network.

 Suggested solution:
  * Open the same amount of circuits. Do not let that depend on if the user
 hosts a hidden service or not.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6470>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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