[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

[tor-bugs] #26919 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Remove fingerprint parameter

#26919: Remove fingerprint parameter
---------------------------------+--------------------------
     Reporter:  karsten          |      Owner:  metrics-team
         Type:  enhancement      |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium           |  Milestone:
    Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal           |   Keywords:
Actual Points:                   |  Parent ID:
       Points:                   |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                   |
---------------------------------+--------------------------
 We have two quite similar parameters: lookup and fingerprint. Both expect
 a full hex fingerprint and return a single relay or bridge (or more than
 just one when we implement #25448).

 The main difference between these two parameters is that fingerprint
 returns relays or bridges regardless of whether they have been running in
 the past week. There is no other way to access these documents other than
 by knowing the exact fingerprint of a relay or hashed fingerprint of a
 bridge. Unlike other parameters, the fingerprint does not even work with
 hashed relay fingerprints or hashed hashed bridge fingerprints.

 Do we need to keep the fingerprint parameter with this somewhat special
 behavior?

 We added the parameter four years ago for one of the EFF relay challenges.
 But is it still in use? And is that because clients really need to access
 older relays and bridges, or because their developers did not know about
 the lookup parameter?

 Setting type to enhancement, because removing the fingerprint parameter
 would let us remove some special code from the code base.

 However, if there are valid use cases to keep the fingerprint parameter,
 let's just collect them here and let the parameter in.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26919>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs