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Re: [tor-bugs] #22400 [Core Tor/Tor]: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live consensus and not enough guards in the state file
#22400: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live
consensus and not enough guards in the state file
--------------------------+------------------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.0.7
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------
Comment (by nickm):
Diagnosis: The "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding" message is a red
herring; that is talking about a cached unverified consensus, as evidenced
by the next line, "Couldn't load unverified consensus microdesc
networkstatus from cache."
What's actually going on here is that we _are_ accepting a slightly old
consensus. The expiration check is:
{{{
if (from_cache && !accept_obsolete &&
c->valid_until < now-OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE) {
log_info(LD_DIR, "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding.");
goto done;
}
}}}
with the relevant constant defined as
{{{
#define OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE (60*60*24*5)
}}}
So, one bug here is that a really old unverified consensus got left
around. We have a ticket for that from 2011 (#4187)!
One other bug is that we're expanding our guard sample even though the
consensus is a few days out of date.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22400#comment:10>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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