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[tor-bugs] #22689 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies
#22689: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies
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Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords: prop224, relay-safety
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #17945
Points: 0.5 | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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This prevents them knowing both the service and client IP addresses, and
therefore being targets for network traffic logging, sybil, or hacking
attacks.
We need to implement the following checks:
* if the introduction point was made using a direct connection (single
onion services), refuse direct client connections,
* if the rend point was made using a direct connection (custom client, no
tor2web for HSv3), refuse direct service connections (single onion
services).
See #22668 for how this is done for HSDir3s using channel_is_client(). The
comments in that patch explain why it works.
We could even refactor the common code out of
connection_dir_is_anonymous() into connection_is_anonymous(), and avoid
including channel[tls].h into directory.c.
I'm not sure if I will get time to do this, so please feel free to take
this ticket.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22689>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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