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Re: [tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)



#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-          |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis                                      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 IIUC, the only way for a client to send two `ESTABLISH_REND` on the same
 circuit is to call `hs_client_circuit_has_opened()` twice, since that's
 the func that calls `client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened()` and
 `rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened()`. s7r seems to disprove this theory in
 comment:18 but I don't see another way.

 My suggestion would be to use the flag `circ->has_opened` that is set by
 `circuit_has_opened()`, and make sure that we don't call
 `hs_client_circuit_has_opened()`  if the `has_opened` flag is already set
 to make sure we dont call the func twice.

 This will block the "double has_opened" theory. There might be other ways
 to cause this bug, or it might just be a custom client, so there is still
 work here...

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:51>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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