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Re: [tor-bugs] #24963 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: Block single hop clients at the intro point



#24963: dos: Block single hop clients at the intro point
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  dgoulet                              |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor2web, tor-hs,            |  Actual Points:  0.1
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328      |
Parent ID:  #24962                               |         Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor27-must
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > I have the same question as:
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24964#comment:6
 >
 > If we're going to do this check in multiple places, we probably need a
 channel_is_known_relay() function.

 Had a talk with teor on IRC. There was some confusion about this being
 applied to `ESTABLISH_INTRO` (service side) but this is only on the client
 side, the `INTRODUCE1` cell requirement which we agree is what we want
 here.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24963#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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