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[tor-bugs] #2668 [Tor Relay]: Rate limit RELAY_EARLY and TLS by IP

#2668: Rate limit RELAY_EARLY and TLS by IP
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |          Owner:       
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  normal     |      Milestone:       
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:       
 Keywords:             |         Parent:  #2664
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:       
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 It is possible to execute an amplification attack on the Tor network
 and/or the directory authorities by launching many onionskin and tls
 attempts to each relay. These onion skins do not have to be valid, and can
 be replays: their only purpose would be to induce a relay to perform the
 PK step to attempt to decrypt them. Such an amplification attack can be
 used to consume all of the spare CPU of a relay.

 One solution would be to rate limit RELAY_EARLY and TLS connections by IP
 address as opposed to by only circuit.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2668>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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