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Re: [tor-bugs] #2570 [Metrics]: Try harder to detect when Tonga's bridge snapshots are stale



#2570: Try harder to detect when Tonga's bridge snapshots are stale
----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  karsten      |       Owner:  karsten
        Type:  enhancement  |      Status:  closed 
    Priority:  normal       |   Milestone:         
   Component:  Metrics      |     Version:         
  Resolution:  implemented  |    Keywords:         
      Parent:               |      Points:         
Actualpoints:               |  
----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------
Changes (by karsten):

  * status:  new => closed
  * resolution:  => implemented


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:2570 karsten]:
 > We should check the descriptor publication times for plausibility.  If a
 status does not have a descriptor published in the last, say, 3 hours
 before the status was published, there's probably something wrong.  We
 should print out a warning in this case, too, and investigate the problem.

 I went with this approach, but with a maximum slack time of 1 hour.  There
 shouldn't be many false positives with 1 hour instead of 3.  A test with
 the January and February 2011 tarballs shows that we'd have learned about
 Tonga's tor process dying 60-90 minutes after the fact.

 > We might also look at the last-modified times of files contained in the
 tarballs.  In theory, the time difference between writing these files and
 writing the tarball should not be higher than 1 hour.

 This is a fine idea if it turns out that the current fix doesn't work well
 enough.  Closing anyway.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2570#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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