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Re: [tor-bugs] #5461 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Circuit reused after New Identity is selected



#5461: Circuit reused after New Identity is selected
----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks           |          Owner:  mikeperry                    
     Type:  defect                |         Status:  new                          
 Priority:  major                 |      Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable
Component:  Firefox Patch Issues  |        Version:                               
 Keywords:                        |         Parent:                               
   Points:                        |   Actualpoints:                               
----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Changes (by mikeperry):

  * priority:  normal => major
  * component:  TorBrowserButton => Firefox Patch Issues
  * milestone:  => TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable


Comment:

 Mother fucker... This is probably due to some form of HTTP keepalive. I
 actually patched Firefox to try to kill keepalive'd connections on New
 Identity (See
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/master:/src/current-
 patches/firefox/0011-Provide-an-observer-event-to-close-persistent-
 connec.patch), but there is now either a regression, or the patch wasn't
 applied this build (sadly not impossible), or perhaps the sites in
 question are using spdy (which is new in Firefox 11) or some other mystery
 is afoot.

 My guess is if you wait 20 seconds, you won't experience the circuit re-
 use. Am I right? That was the case for me on MacOS. (Note that 20 second
 is our new reduced HTTP Keep-Alive timeout).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5461#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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