[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count)
#29801: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP
Version Failure Count)
---------------------------+------------------------------
Reporter: neel | Owner: neel
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ipv6, prop299 | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #27491 | Points:
Reviewer: nickm | Sponsor:
---------------------------+------------------------------
Comment (by nickm):
Hi! Here are my initial questions on the proposal.
First off, I'd like to understand how this interacts with the guard-
selection algorithms in guard-spec.txt. At what stage(s) during guard
selection _exactly_ do we take these probabilities into account?
Second, I'd like to understand better why we are picking the constants we
have here. Why are werounding everything to multiples of 1/4, and
rounding up to 1/4. I understand that we don't want to reduce the
probability to 0, but why 1/4 and not some other value? Similarly, why
are we counting "no route" as twice as bad as a regular failure, instead
of 1.5x or 3x or something?
Third, I'm assuming that we only do this algorithm when we detect that we
are dual-stack. If we only have an ipv6 address or an ipv4 address, then
we should just assume that's the only one we can use, right?
Fourth, the halving algorithm seems kind of complicated to me. In some
other places, we halve things like this based on the passage of time,
rather than on their totals. Would that make sense here?
Fifth, I don't understand section 7. Why would a client need to make 4
connections at once to a guard?
Sixth, what should the default be for ClientAutoIPv6ORPort?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29801#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs