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Re: [tor-bugs] #5761 [TorBrowserButton]: Decide if it's safe to pass the Dooble around the Tor Community



#5761: Decide if it's safe to pass the Dooble around the Tor Community
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  mike123           |       Owner:  mike123
        Type:  enhancement       |      Status:  closed 
    Priority:  normal            |   Milestone:         
   Component:  TorBrowserButton  |     Version:         
  Resolution:  invalid           |    Keywords:         
      Parent:                    |      Points:         
Actualpoints:                    |  
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Comment(by textbrowser):

 Thanks mike1234567890. You couldn't resist? Such a valiant effort for an
 undeserving audience. OK, I'll be nice.

 Some other thoughts.

 Replaced cookies.db. The database now houses encoded values of raw forms.
 One field.

 For the curious, hashes that include salts offer protection against
 rainbow tables.

 The random passphrases have always been 256 or so bytes. They have never
 been fewer than 16 bytes.

 Researching the suggestion pertaining to the use of hashes of passphrases
 as cipher keys.

 Now discarding the provided passphrase. Poof.

 Yeah. The changes were completed in a few days without a commitment from
 this or any other group.

 I like how some functions work. They're predictable. Logging may become
 fancier and more informative.

 Some YouTube videos play without enabling Web plugins.

 The important conclusion is that "Doobie" isn't a bogus project. We're
 still evolving, learning, twisting.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5761#comment:34>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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