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Re: [tor-bugs] #5477 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Surprising DOM origins before HTTPS-E/NoScript redirects have completed

#5477: Surprising DOM origins before HTTPS-E/NoScript redirects have completed
-------------------------------------+--------------------------------------
    Reporter:  Drugoy                |       Owner:  ma1     
        Type:  defect                |      Status:  reopened
    Priority:  blocker               |   Milestone:          
   Component:  EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |     Version:          
  Resolution:                        |    Keywords:          
      Parent:                        |      Points:          
Actualpoints:                        |  
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Comment(by pde):

 Aside from the horrible about:blank#id hack solution discussed above,
 another horrible approach would be to try to get a callback when the
 malicious code alters the content of the http://www.apple.com window. If
 someone changes the content of a window that we're replaceChanneling, we
 could try to abort the channel replacement. Although that does sound a
 little racy.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5477#comment:39>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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