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Re: [tor-bugs] #8243 [Tor]: Getting the HSDir flag should require more effort

#8243: Getting the HSDir flag should require more effort
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma     |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  needs_review
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
     Priority:  major    |    Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  SponsorR, tor-auth, needs-proposal,
   Resolution:           |  026-triaged-1, 027-triaged-1-in, SponsorU,
Actual Points:           |  026-backport
       Points:  medium   |  Parent ID:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:26 dgoulet]:
 > Replying to [comment:25 nickm]:
 > > I think looking at node->is_stable might be incorrect. That makes us
 look at the node's stability value form the _last_ consensus, right?  (Or
 did we just go through all the node_t objects and set that?)
 >
 > It's set in `set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo()` which set both the
 `routerstatus_t` and `node_t` variable `is_stable` at the same time.
 >
 > Few line after, `dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir()` is called so it
 seems that using `node->is_stable` in that function will give us the
 latest status we have on that relay.

 That seems right.

 Patch looks correct in general, but it still uses the
 `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` uptime check . Do we still want that check
 in? In prop243 I suggested we remove it, but I could be convinced
 otherwise.

 Also, since we didn't remove the other check, and we just added another
 constraint, how could the number of HSDirs increase as the changes file
 claims? Finally, probably in the changes file I would write something like
 "Make it harder to launch Sybil attacks by ..." so that it gives some
 rationale for our action.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8243#comment:27>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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