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Re: [tor-bugs] #21642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop275: Eliminate "published" times from microdescriptor consensus
#21642: Prop275: Eliminate "published" times from microdescriptor consensus
------------------------------------------------+--------------------------
Reporter: nickm | Owner: nickm
Type: enhancement | Status:
| merge_ready
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: TorCoreTeam201703, review-group-17 | Actual Points: .5
Parent ID: | Points: 2
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor4
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Comment (by arma):
Thoughts:
A) I think the patch in prop275_minimal_029 is safe and fine.
B) Check out in mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old() how we decide to
republish our descriptor if our consensus entry says our descriptor is
more than 18 hours old (#3327):
{{{
else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff)
retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old";
}}}
So if we do the next step, which would be setting the timestamp to 2037 or
whatever, we will disable this hack. Are we still using the hack much? I
think we added it because we have a bunch of subtle bugs where relays
forget to republish, or where relays *do* republish but the dir auths drop
their newly published descriptor because it's too similar to the last one.
I don't think we found or fixed those bugs.
At first I thought "hey, no problem, relays cache both flavors of
consensus, because directory_caches_dir_info is so lenient." But then I
realized that in the above code snippet, the rs is gotten from
networkstatus_get_latest_consensus(), which will be the microdesc
consensus. So I have resumed thinking that if we set published_on to
always 2037, we will be disabling this hack. :(
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21642#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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