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[tor-bugs] #4390 [Tor Bridge]: The rotation of the TLS context can act as a fingerprint for bridges

#4390: The rotation of the TLS context can act as a fingerprint for bridges
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  asn         |          Owner:     
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:     
Component:  Tor Bridge  |        Version:     
 Keywords:              |         Parent:     
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:     
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Censors can monitor the traffic of a suspected bridge every
 MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL and see if the TLS certificate has changed.

 Normal SSL services don't change certificates every 2 hours.

 Maybe we should consider increasing MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL.
 Maybe we should consider implementing and documenting it as part of
 prop179 (#3972).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4390>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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