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Re: [tor-bugs] #16943 [Tor]: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)
#16943: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Severity: Blocker | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #8244 | Points: large
Sponsor: SponsorR |
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Comment (by asn):
OK, here is the latest state of the game here.
In my torspec branch `prop250-nosrkeys-v2` you can find prop250 without
the SR keys as discussed here: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
dev/2015-November/009875.html
In my tor branch `prop250-nosrkeys-day1` you can find the corresponding
code, where we use the ed25519 master key for referencing, and the RSA
identity key to detect multiple commits by a single authority. I also
fixed the `get_state_valid_until_time()` function and wrote some
unittests.
I think the next step in our simplification process here is to refactor
the `decide()` step which is not really useful anymore now that we don't
do majority or conflicts. I imagine that we could make it so that there is
no decide step or `voted_commits`, and we just move valid authoritative
commits directly to the sr state during vote parsing.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16943#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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