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Re: [tor-bugs] #23512 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells



#23512: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, congestion-attack,   |  Actual Points:
  research, watermark, tor-stats, guard-         |
  discovery-stats, 034-triage-20180328,          |
  034-removed-20180328                           |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet                              |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  SponsorQ
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Jaym - how did you test this? And how large was this write discrepancy?

 It is surprising that it is reporting more written than read -- we made
 conservative assumptions about TLS overhead (we report as if there are
 always 2 cells written per TLS payload, which is the minimum possible
 written overhead) that should mean that the reported write totals are
 always <= the read totals.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23512#comment:36>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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