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[tor-bugs] #6768 [Tor Client]: Client fails to pick an exit for https connection



#6768: Client fails to pick an exit for https connection
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  ln5         |          Owner:     
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:     
Component:  Tor Client  |        Version:     
 Keywords:              |         Parent:     
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:     
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 A TorTestingNetwork with 11 relays (3 dir auths, 1 bridge auth), most
 of them running master as of late August plus IPv6 patches. Client and
 exit running master as of early Sept without IPv6 patches.

 Exit policy accept port 80, 443 and deny *. Haven't been able to
 reproduce with default exit policy (i.e. no ExitPolicy directive in
 config).

 curl https://check.torproject.org/ fails with client saying

 {{{
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] exit circ (length 3, last hop dfri02x):
 $80CC45020AC1073A767DB5D038A31ED50D56F869(open)
 $42C79519EAB12BA36C627194DC4BD2228E67EB0F(open)
 $E0CF1972093B7D13DF82A620D56CFD0A6BB7687A(open)
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [debug] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): starting to
 send subsequent skin.
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [debug] circuit_build_times_disabled():
 CircuitBuildTime learning is not disabled. Consensus=0, Config=0,
 AuthDir=0, StateFile=0
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [debug] circuit_build_times_add_time(): Adding circuit
 build time 13
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [debug] circuit_build_times_disabled():
 CircuitBuildTime learning is not disabled. Consensus=0, Config=0,
 AuthDir=0, StateFile=0
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #0: 225
 116
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #1: 275
 111
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #2: 325
 86
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout_worker():
 Circuit build measurement period of 60000ms is more than twice the maximum
 build time we have ever observed. Capping it to 2150ms.
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout(): Set
 buildtimeout to low value 487.234426ms. Setting to 1500ms
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout(): Set circuit
 build timeout to 2s (1500.000000ms, 2150.000000ms, Xm: 270, a: 2.726366,
 r: 0.000000) based on 1000 circuit times
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): circuit built!
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] pathbias_count_success(): Got success count
 192/186 for guard ndn00a=80CC45020AC1073A767DB5D038A31ED50D56F869
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [notice] pathbias_count_success(): Bug: Unexpectedly
 high circuit_successes (192/186) for guard
 ndn00a=80CC45020AC1073A767DB5D038A31ED50D56F869
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [debug] new_route_len(): Chosen route length 3 (11/11
 routers suitable).
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] choose_good_exit_server_general(): Found 0
 servers that might support 0/1 pending connections.
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] choose_good_exit_server_general(): We couldn't
 find any live, fast routers; falling back to list of all routers.
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [info] choose_good_exit_server_general(): Found 0
 servers that might support 0/1 pending connections.
 Sep 04 23:54:01.000 [notice] All routers are down or won't exit --
 choosing a doomed exit at random.
 }}}

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6768>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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