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Re: [tor-bugs] #1854 [Analysis]: Investigate raising the minimum bandwidth for getting the Fast flag



#1854: Investigate raising the minimum bandwidth for getting the Fast flag
---------------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma                       |          Owner:  arma    
     Type:  task                       |         Status:  assigned
 Priority:  normal                     |      Milestone:          
Component:  Analysis                   |        Version:          
 Keywords:  performance loadbalancing  |         Parent:          
   Points:                             |   Actualpoints:          
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Comment(by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:14 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 karsten]:
 > > So, is this ticket about dropping relays from the consensus, or taking
 away their Fast flag?  I can see how we can graph the former, but I'm not
 sure about the latter.
 >
 > Shouldn't matter much.

 Really?

 > I guess that leads to: do your consensus diversity analysis tools
 consider the Fast flag? They probably should, since clients do.

 Our tools don't consider the Fast flag.  They're only based on relays'
 consensus weights, their Exit and Guard flags, and the `bandwidth-weights`
 line.

 Simulating what clients would do, including considering the Fast flag is
 almost impossible.  There are too many variables which relays clients
 would pick depending on what other relays they already have in their
 circuit, including family settings and same /16's, that we can't
 reasonably model.  If we want results this precise, we'll have to run
 simulations with the actual Tor code.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1854#comment:19>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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