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Re: [tor-bugs] #6866 [Tor Client]: pathbias_count_first_hop(): Bug: circuitbuild.c:2650
#6866: pathbias_count_first_hop(): Bug: circuitbuild.c:2650
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Reporter: fob | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version: Tor: 0.2.3.21-rc
Keywords: MikePerry201209 | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by rransom):
Replying to [comment:5 mikeperry]:
> I spent a little time looking at the Tor2web codepaths. I'm still not
100% clear where it is picking up the extra hop in normal operation. As
far as I can tell, tor2web circuits should only be 1 hop, should not be
possible to cannibalize,
If a hidden service client fails to introduce to a hidden service (or
times out) at one of the services' introduction points, the hidden-service
client code will extend the introduction circuit by one hop to the next
introduction point it chooses. (This is a big win for non-tor2web-mode HS
clients.)
> and there should be no client activity allowed other than tor2web's one-
hop hidden service client traffic.
tor2web mode does not prevent the user from operating a hidden service
with that Tor instance. (The service-side part of a hidden service is
client-ish enough to build circuits.)
Perhaps it should prevent users from operating hidden services, and turn
off UseEntryGuards (as I understand it, this would disable the path-bias
detection code). They're not getting anonymity anyway.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6866#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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