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Re: [tor-bugs] #17857 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled

#17857: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
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 Reporter:  teor                           |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement                    |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                         |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                   |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                         |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, sos, tor-hs, isaremoved  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                 |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                 |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by mikeperry):

 For KISS principles: I think the simplest thing to do here is to add a
 consensus parameter that disables netflow padding for all Tor processes
 have RSOS or tor2web enabled (ie: for the service/server side, not for
 clients). It should be an emergency-use only thing, for us to set if the
 overhead looks exceptionally high, and we suspect RSOS/tor2web to be a
 major source of the problem, and we're looking to stop the bleeding.

 For all other non-emergency tuning, it should be enough to advise RSOS
 services to disable or reduce netflow padding themselves via torrc, or
 make a new release with different default behavior for them.

 Furthermore: I'm guessing that the overhead for most RSOS and tor2web
 users won't actually be very high. The netflow padding doesn't add
 overhead to connections that stay active, and both RSOS and tor2web
 server-side instances are likely to be under heavy use. This also makes me
 lean in the direction of only providing an emergency "shut-er-down" switch
 (which we already have for netflow padding as a whole).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17857#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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