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[tor-commits] [webwml/staging] Drop 'Tails server' project idea



commit e18e846f7838bcf3988aa5179ee9f93a679eaea3
Author: Damian Johnson <atagar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Sun Jan 29 13:09:34 2017 -0800

    Drop 'Tails server' project idea
    
    Last year we had a student that did this (segfault).
---
 getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml | 81 --------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 81 deletions(-)

diff --git a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
index 6f1f3ea..5671320 100644
--- a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
+++ b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
@@ -1163,87 +1163,6 @@ implementation.
     </p>
     </li>
 
-    <a id="tailsServer"></a>
-    <li>
-    <b>Tails server: Self-hosted services behind Tails-powered Tor hidden services</b>
-    <br>
-    Likely Mentors: <i>anonym, George (asn)</i>
-    <p>Let's talk about group collaboration, communication and data sharing
-    infrastructure, such as chat servers, wikis, or file repositories.</p>
-    <p>Hosting such data and infrastructure <b>in the cloud</b> generally
-    implies to trust the service providers not to disclose content, usage or
-    users location information to third-parties. Hence, there are many threat
-    models in which cloud hosting is not suitable.</p>
-    <p>Tor partly answers the <b>users location</b> part; this is great, but
-    <b>content</b> is left unprotected.</p>
-    <p>There are two main ways to protect such content: either to encrypt it
-    client-side (<b>security by design</b>), or to avoid putting it into
-    untrusted hands in the first place.</p>
-    <p>Cloud solutions that offer security by design are rare and generally
-    not mature yet. The <b>Tails server</b> project is about exploring the
-    other side of the alternative: avoiding to put private data into
-    untrusted hands in the first place.</p>
-    <p>This is made possible thanks to Tor hidden services, that allow users
-    to offer location-hidden services, and make self-hosting possible in
-    many threat models. Self-hosting has its own lot of problems, however,
-    particularly in contexts where the physical security of the hosting
-    place is not assured. Combining Tor hidden services with Tails'
-    amnesia property and limited support for persistent encrypted data
-    allows to protect content, to a great degree, even in such contexts.</p>
-    <p>In short, setting up a new Tails server would be done by:</p>
-
-    <ol style="list-style-type: decimal">
-      <li>Alice plugs a USB stick into a running desktop Tails system.</li>
-      <li>Alice uses a GUI to easily configure the needed services.</li>
-      <li>Alice unplugs the USB stick, that now contains encrypted services
-      configuration and data storage space.</li>
-      <li>Alice plugs that USB stick (and possibly a Tails Live CD) into the
-      old laptop that was dedicated to run Tails server.</li>
-      <li>Once booted, Alice enters the encryption passphrase either
-      directly using the keyboard or through a web interface listening on the
-      local network.</li>
-      <li>Then, Bob can use the configured services once he gets a hold on
-      the hidden service address. (The <b>petname system for Tor hidden
-      services</b> project would be very complementary to this one, by the
-      way.)</li>
-    </ol>
-
-    <p>Tails server should content itself with hardware that is a bit old
-    (such as a PIII-450 laptop with 256MB of RAM) and/or half broken (e.g.
-    non-functional hard-disk, screen or keyboard).</p>
-    <p>The challenges behind this project are:</p>
-
-    <ul>
-      <li>Design and write the services configuration GUI [keywords: edit
-      configuration files, upgrade between major Debian versions,
-      debconf].</li>
-      <li>How to create the hidden service key? [keywords: Vidalia, control
-      protocol].</li>
-      <li>Adapt the Tails boot process to allow switching to &quot;server
-      mode&quot; when appropriate.</li>
-      <li>Add support, to the Tails persistence setup process, for asking an
-      encryption passphrase without X, and possibly with a broken keyboard
-      and/or screen [keywords: local network, SSL/TLS?, certificate?].</li>
-    </ul>
-
-    <p>This project can easily grow quite large, so the first task would
-    probably be to clarify what it would need to get an initial (minimal
-    but working) implementation ready to be shipped to users.</p>
-    <p>This project does not require to be an expert in one specific field,
-    but it requires to be experienced and at ease with a large scope of
-    software development tools, processes, and operating system knowledge.</p>
-    <p>Undertaking this project requires in-depth knowledge of Debian-like
-    systems (self-test: do the "dpkg conffile" and "debconf preseeding"
-    words sound new to your ear?); the Debian Live persistence system
-    being written in shell, being at ease with robust shell scripting is
-    a must; to end with, at least two pieces of software need to be
-    written from scratch (a GUI and a webapp): the preferred languages for
-    these tasks would be Python and Perl. Using Behaviour Driven
-    Development methods to convey expectations and acceptance criteria
-    would be most welcome.</p>
-    <p>For more information see https://tails.boum.org/todo/server_edition/</p>
-    </li>
-
     <a id="feedbackExtension"></a>
     <li>
     <b>Feedback Extension for Tor Browser</b>



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