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[or-cvs] r22048: {website} Now that the design paper was moved back to Subversion, fix (in website/trunk: bms de en es fi fr it ja nl pl pt ru se zh-cn)



Author: sjm217
Date: 2010-03-25 16:12:54 +0000 (Thu, 25 Mar 2010)
New Revision: 22048

Modified:
   website/trunk/bms/faq.wml
   website/trunk/de/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/en/faq.wml
   website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/es/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/fr/faq.wml
   website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/it/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/it/faq.wml
   website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/pl/faq.wml
   website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/se/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml
Log:
Now that the design paper was moved back to Subversion, fix links (see tor.git changeset f164a76 and svn revision r21665). Found by katoda

Modified: website/trunk/bms/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/bms/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/bms/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@
 <p>
 <b>Authentication</b>: Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called
 the "onion key".  When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
 that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way the first
 node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.  Each relay rotates
 its onion key once a week.
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@
 the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor users know about all Tor
 relays). Changes like this can have large impact on potential and actual
 anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper for
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper for
 details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/de/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/de/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/de/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>Video</a>, <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>Folien</a>, <a
 href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html";>Kurzdarstellung</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">Designvorschlag</a>) und
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">Designvorschlag</a>) und
 Rogers Vortrag <q>Current events in 2007</q> vom 24C3 aus dem Dezember 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4";>Video</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-24c3.pdf";>Folien</a>, <a
@@ -153,13 +153,13 @@
   <ul>
     <li>Das <b>Designdokument</b> (zur Usenix Security 2004 verÃffentlicht)
       gibt dir unsere Einstellungen und Sicherheitsanalyse zum Tor-Design:
-      <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF-Entwurf  (engl.)</a> und
-      <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML-Entwurf (engl.)</a>
+      <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF-Entwurf  (engl.)</a> und
+      <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML-Entwurf (engl.)</a>
       stehen zur VerfÃgung.</li>
     <li>Das darauf folgende Papier mit dem Titel <q>challenges in low-latency
       anonymity</q> (noch im Entwurf) hat mehr Details Ãber die letzten
       Erfahrungen und Richtungen: <a
-      href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF version
+      href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF version
       (engl.)</a>.</li>
       <li>Unsere VerÃffentlichung bei der WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves
       Company: Usability and the Network Effect</b> &mdash; erklÃrt, warum
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
       <li>Unser vorlÃufiges Design, um Firewalls den Zugriff auf das
       Tornetzwerk zu erschweren, ist in <b>design of a blocking-resistant
       anonymity system</b> (<a
-      href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF-Entwurf</a>)
+      href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF-Entwurf</a>)
       beschrieben. Du kannst auch einen Blick auf die <a
       href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>Vortragsunterlagen</a>
       oder das <a

Modified: website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
 <p>Es gibt detailliertere Beschreibungen zu dem Protokoll als diese
 Seite. Schaue dir hierzu die
 <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Designbeschreibung
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Designbeschreibung
 von Tor</a> und die
 <a
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">Rendezvous-Spezifikation</a>

Modified: website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
 seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 <br />
@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@
 overhaul if the results are good.</li>
 <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
 an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
 it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
 steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
 block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of

Modified: website/trunk/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/en/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@
 <b>Authentication</b>:
 Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
 When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
 that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way
 the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.
 Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@
 relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
 users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
 impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
 for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 <p>
 There are more detailed descriptions about the hidden service protocol than
 this one. See the
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
 for an in-depth design description and the
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">rendezvous specification</a>
 for the message formats.

Modified: website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.1.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
 and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@
 overhaul if the results are good.</li>
 <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
 an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
 it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
 steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
 block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of

Modified: website/trunk/es/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/es/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/es/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -83,12 +83,12 @@
 <li>El <b>documento de dise&ntilde;o</b> (publicado en Usenix Security 2004)
 da nuestras justificaciones y anÃlisis de seguridad para el dise&ntilde;o de Tor:
 versiones disponibles
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> y
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> y
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 .</li>
 <li>Nuestro documento de reafirmaciÃn en <b>desafÃos en el anonimato de baja latencia</b>
 (todavÃa en forma de borrador) detalla experiencias y direcciones mas recientes:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">versiÃn PDF</a>.</li>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">versiÃn PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Nuestro artÃculo en WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect (Al anonimato le encanta la compaÃÃa:
 Usabilidad y el efecto en red)</b> &mdash; explica porquà la usabilidad
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@
 <li>Nuestro diseÃo preliminar para hacer mÃs difÃcil que cortafuegos grandes
 eviten el acceso a la red Tor se describe en 
 <b>el diseÃo de un sistema de anonimato resistente al bloqueo</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">borrador PDF</a> y
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">borrador HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">borrador PDF</a> y
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">borrador HTML</a>.
 TambiÃn puede ver <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>transparencias</a> y <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>vÃdeo</a>

Modified: website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
 de destino (en los nodos de salida). Si le importa mucho IPv6, Ãse es
 probablemente el primer sitio para empezar.</li>
 <li>ÂNo le gusta ninguna de Ãstas? Mire el <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan de desarrollo Tor</a> 
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan de desarrollo Tor</a> 
 para mÃs ideas.</li>
 <li>ÂNo ve su idea aquÃ? ÂProbablemente la necesitemos de todas formas! 
 ContÃctenos y averÃgÃelo.</li>

Modified: website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 
 <li>
 There's a skeletal <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">list of items
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">list of items
 we'd like to tackle in the future</a>. Alas, many of those items need
 to be fleshed out more before they'll make sense to people who aren't
 Tor developers, but you can still get a general sense of what issues
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>video</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>slides</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html";>abstract</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
 and Roger's "Current events in 2007" talk from 24C3 in December
 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4";>video</a>,
@@ -175,12 +175,12 @@
 <ul>
 <li>The <b>design document</b> (published at Usenix Security 2004)
 gives our justifications and security analysis for the Tor design:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> and
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> and
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 versions available.</li>
 <li>Our follow-up paper on <b>challenges in low-latency anonymity</b>
 (still in draft form) details more recent experiences and directions:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 draft</a>.</li>
 <li>Our paper at WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> &mdash; explains why usability in
@@ -189,8 +189,8 @@
 <li>Our preliminary design to make it harder for large firewalls to
 prevent access to the Tor network is described in
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a> and
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">HTML draft</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a> and
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">HTML draft</a>.
 Want to <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">help us build it</a>?</li>
 <li>The <b>specifications</b> aim to give
 developers enough information to build a compatible version of Tor:

Modified: website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
 seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 <br />
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@
 <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>
 <br />
 Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">Tor development
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">Tor development
 roadmap</a> for more ideas.
 </li>
 

Modified: website/trunk/fr/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fr/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fr/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@
 <b>Authentification</b>: Chaque noeud Tor a une clef de dÃchiffrement
 publique appelÃe "clef oignon".  Lorsque le client met en place des
 circuits, Ã chaque Ãtape il <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demande que
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demande que
 le noeud Tor prouve la connaissance de sa propre clef oignon</a>. Ainsi, le
 premier noeud du circuit ne peut usurper le reste du circuit.  Chaque noeud
 change de clef oignon une fois par semaine.
@@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@
 que tous les utilisateurs Tor connaissent l'intÃgralità des noeuds Tor). Les
 changement à ce niveau peuvent avoir des consÃquences sur
 l'anonymat. Consultez la section 4 de notre article sur <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">nos dÃfis</a> pour plus
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">nos dÃfis</a> pour plus
 dÃtails. Encore une fois, le transport par UDP devrait amÃliorer grandement
 la situation.
 </p>

Modified: website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
 <p>
 Il existe d'autres documentations plus complÃtes sur le protocole de service
 cachà que celle-ci. Consultez le <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">document de spÃcification de
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">document de spÃcification de
 Tor</a> pour une description plus approfondie ainsi que la <a
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">spÃcification rendez-vous</a> pour le
 format de messages. 

Modified: website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
 <i>Medium to High</i> <br /> Effort Level: <i>Medium</i> <br /> Skill Level:
 <i>High</i> <br /> Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i> <br /> The Tor
 0.2.1.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant improvements</a>
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant improvements</a>
 in resisting national and organizational censorship.  But Tor still needs
 better mechanisms for some parts of its anti-censorship design.  For
 example, current Tors can only listen on a single address/port combination
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a> just by
 trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and seeing if they
 respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools, and
 not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.  To
 start, check out Shane Pope's <a
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@
 et peut-Ãtre de refondre quelquechose si les rÃsultats s'avÃrent bons.</li>
 <li>Nos objectifs de rÃsistance à la censure incluent l'impossibilità pour un
 attaquant qui observe le trafic Tor de <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">le
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">le
 distinguer d'un trafic SSL normal</a>. NÃanmoins, nous ne pouvons pas
 recrÃer une stÃganographie parfaire tout en restant utilisable mais, dans un
 premier temps, nous aimerions pouvoir bloquer toute attaque qui pourrait

Modified: website/trunk/it/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>video</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>slide</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html";>abstract</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
 e la presentazione "Current events in 2007" sempre di Roger al 24C3 nel Dicembre
 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4";>video</a>,
@@ -185,12 +185,12 @@
 <li>I <b>documenti di design</b> (pubblicati alla Usenix Security 2004)
 forniscono i fondamenti e le analisi di sicurezza di Tor:
 in versione
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.
 </li>
 <li>Il nostro studio successivo sulle <b>sfide nell'anonimato a bassa latenza</b>
 (ancora in versione di bozza) descrive nel dettaglio esperienze e direzioni di sviluppo recenti:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">bozza
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">bozza
 PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Il nostro paper al WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> &mdash; spiega perch&eacute; l'usabilit&agrave; nei
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@
 <li>Il nostro progetto preliminare per impedire ai firewall di
 bloccare l'accesso alla rete Tor &egrave; descritto in
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">bozza PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">bozza HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">bozza PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">bozza HTML</a>.
 Vedi anche le <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>diapositive</a> e il<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>video</a>

Modified: website/trunk/it/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@
 <b>Autenticazione</b>:
 Ogni relay Tor ha una chiave pubblica di decifratura detta "onion key".
 Quanto il client Tor stabilisce dei circuiti, ad ogni passaggio <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">richiede
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">richiede
 che il relay Tor dimostri di conoscere la sua onion key</a>. In questo modo
 il primo nodo del percorso non pu&ograve; semplicemente falsificare il resto del percorso.
 Ogni relay ruota la sua onion key ogni settimana.
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@
 Tor) sia della directory (smettere di obbligare tutti gli utenti Tor
 a sapere quali sono tutti i relay Tor). Simili cabiamenti potrebbero avere
 un impatto enorme sull'anonimato potenziale e reale. Vedi la sezione 5 del paper <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a>
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a>
 per maggiori informazioni. Ancora, il trasporto UDP potrebbe essere molto utile qui.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
 <p>
 Ci sono descrizioni del protocollo hidden service pi&ugrave; approfondite 
 di questa. Vedi il
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
 per una descrizione dettagliata e la
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">rendezvous specification</a>
 per il formato dei messaggi.

Modified: website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
 seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 <br />
@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@
 se i risultati fossero soddisfacenti.</li>
 <li>Uno degli obiettivi per resistere alla censura &egrave; impedire
 ad un attaccante che osservi il traffico Tor su una connessione di <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguerlo
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguerlo
 dal normale traffico SSL</a>. Non possiamo ovviamente ottenere perfetta
 steganografia e al contempo essere ancora utilizzabili, ma come primo passo ci
 bloccare tutti quegli attacchi che funzionano solo osservando pochi pacchetti. Uno degli

Modified: website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>ããã</a>ã
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>ãããã</a>ã
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html";>èç</a>ã
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">èèææ</a>)ã
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">èèææ</a>)ã
 ããã2007å12æã24C3ããRogerã"Current events in 2007"ããã
 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4";>ããã</a>,
@@ -192,12 +192,12 @@
 <ul>
 <li><b>èèãããããã</b> (Usenix Security 2004ãåé)
 Torãèèãååæçãããããããåæããããçåãäãããããã:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a>ããã
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a>ããã
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 ãéèåèããã</li>
 <li>èåææã<b>äãããããåååãèé</b>
 (ããããããåå)ãææãçéãååããããæãäããããã:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 ãããã</a>.</li>
 
 <li>
@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@
 <li>åããããããããããããTorããããããããããããã
 ééãããããããããçéãæçããæåçãããããããããã
 <b>æããããããåååããããããããã</b>ãèããããããã:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF ãããã</a> ããã
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">HTML ãããã</a>ã
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF ãããã</a> ããã
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">HTML ãããã</a>ã
 <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">ããããæä
 </a>ããããããããï</li>
 <li><b>äæ</b>ããéçèãäææãããTorãããããããåäããããååã

Modified: website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 Tor 0.2.0.xãããããååãççãããæéãåããææåãéãã
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">èããéæ</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">èããéæ</a>
 ãéããããããããããTorãäçãããããåæéãèèãããããã
 éåããããããããããããããåèãããããããäããã
 çåãTorãåæãåäããããã/ãããããããããããããã
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Torãããã</a>
 ãèåããããããããããããåéãèæããããããããããããããããããã
 ãããããããããããããããã
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">ããããããã
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">ããããããã
 ãããæãèã</a>(HTTPãããHTTPSã)ãããããããããåæãéãäãããéã
 ãããããããæãèããããããããããããããèãããããã
 <br />
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@
 ããååããèæããããããããããããã</li>
 <li>çãããææéãçæãäãããããåçäãTorãéäãèåãããã
 ææèã<a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
 TorãéäãéåãSSLãéäãååãã</a>
 ãããåãããããæããããããæãããçãããååãäçåçåèã
 ããããããããããåããããåæãããããåããäæãããæåã

Modified: website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@
 <ul>
 <li>Het <b>ontwerpdocument</b> gepubliceerd op het Usenix Security 2004
 symposium geeft de onderbouwing en veiligheidsanalyse voor het Tor concept: 
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> en
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> en
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 versies beschikbaar.</li>
 <li>Ons opvolgende werkdocument over <b>uitdagingen in laag-latente anonimiteit</b>
 zet onze recente ervaringen en richtingen uiteen:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 werkdocument</a>.</li>
 <li>Ons artikel op de WEIS 2006 getiteld <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> legt uit hoe de bruikbaarheid van
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@
 <li>Ons voorlopig ontwerp, om het grote firewalls moeilijker te maken 
 de toegang tot het Tor network te blokkeren, wordt beschreven in
 <b>Design of a Blocking-Resistant Anonymity System</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF werkdocument</a> en
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">HTML werkdocument</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF werkdocument</a> en
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">HTML werkdocument</a>.
 U kunt ook de <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>dia's</a> en <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>videoclip</a>

Modified: website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
 eerste plaats om te beginnen.</li>
 
 <li>Geen van alle naar uw zin? Kijk naar de <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan voor verdere
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan voor verdere
 ontwikkeling van Tor</a> voor meer ideeë</li>
 <li>Uw idee hier niet gevonden? Tien tegen é dat we het toch nodig hebben! Neem
 contact met ons op.</li>

Modified: website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>wideo</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>slajdy</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html";>abstrakt</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">dokument projektowy</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">dokument projektowy</a>),
 lub przemÃwienie "BieÅÄce wydarzenia w roku 2007" Rogera z 24C3 w grudniu
 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4";>wideo</a>,
@@ -189,11 +189,11 @@
 <ul>
 <li><b>Dokumenty Projektu</b> (opublikowane na Usenix Security 2004)
  podaje nasze uzasadnienia i analizy bezpieczeÅstwa projektu Tora: sÄ wersje
- <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> i
- <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> i
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
 <li>Nasz dodatkowy dokument na temat <b>wyzwaÅ w krÃtkoczasowej anonimowoÅci</b>
  (ciÄgle w postaci szkicu) podaje szczegÃÅy nowszych doÅwiadczeÅ i kierunki:
- <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">szkic
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">szkic
  PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Nasz dokument z WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>AnonimowoÅÄ uwielbia towarzystwo:
   uÅytecznoÅÄ i efekt sieci</b> &mdash; tÅumaczy, dlaczego uÅytecznoÅÄ w
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@
 <li>Nasz wstÄpny projekt jak utrudniÄ wielkim zaporom ogniowym (firewallom)
  zapobieganie dostÄpowi do sieci Tor jest opisany w
   <b>projekcie systemu anonimowoÅci odpornego na blokowanie</b>:
-  <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">szkic PDF</a> i
-  <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">szkic HTML</a>.
+  <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">szkic PDF</a> i
+  <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">szkic HTML</a>.
   Chcesz <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">pomÃc nam to stworzyÄ</a>?</li>
 <li><b>Specyfikacje</b> majÄ za zadanie daÄ
  deweloperom doÅÄ informacji, by stworzyÄ kompatybilnÄ wersjÄ Tora:

Modified: website/trunk/pl/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
 <b>Uwierzytelnianie</b>: KaÅdy przekaÅnik sieci Tora ma publiczny klucz
 deszyfrujÄcy zwany "kluczem cebulowym". Gdy klient Tora uruchamia obwody, na
 kaÅdym kroku <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">ÅÄda, by
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">ÅÄda, by
 przekaÅnik sieci udowodniÅ znajomoÅÄ swojego klucza cebulowego</a>. Tym
 sposobem, pierwszy wÄzeÅ w ÅcieÅce nie moÅe podszyÄ siÄ pod resztÄ
 ÅcieÅki. KaÅdy przekaÅnik zmienia swÃj klucz raz w tygodniu.
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@
 przestaÄ wymagaÄ, by wszyscy uÅytkownicy Tora wiedzieli o wszystkich
 przekaÅnikach). Takie zmiany mogÄ mieÄ wielki wpÅyw na potencjalnÄ i
 rzeczywistÄ anonimowoÅÄ. Przeczytaj sekcjÄ 5 dokumentu <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Wyzwania</a>, by poznaÄ
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Wyzwania</a>, by poznaÄ
 szczegÃÅy. Ponownie, transport UDP by tu pomÃgÅ.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
 
 <p>
 IstniejÄ bardziej szczegÃÅowe opisy protokoÅu usÅug ukrytych niÅ ta strona.
-Przeczytaj <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">dokument projektowy Tora</a>
+Przeczytaj <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">dokument projektowy Tora</a>
 zawierajÄcy dogÅÄbny opis projektu, oraz
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">specyfikacjÄ spotkaÅ (rendezvous)</a>,
 zawierajÄcÄ formaty wiadomoÅci.

Modified: website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@
 Prawdopodobni opiekunowie: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 Wersje 0.2.1.x Tora robiÄ <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">znaczne postÄpy</a> w opieraniu
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">znaczne postÄpy</a> w opieraniu
 siÄ narodowej i firmowej cenzurze. Ale Tor ciÄgle potrzebuje lepszych mechanizmÃw w
 niektÃrych czÄÅciach projektu anty-cenzurowania. Na przykÅad, bieÅÄce wersje mogÄ
 nasÅuchiwaÄ poÅÄczeÅ tylko na jednym zestawie adres/port na raz. Istnieje
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">mostki Tora</a>
 po prostu ÅÄczÄc siÄ z nimi, zgodnie z protokoÅem Tora, i sprawdzajÄc,
 czy odpowiadajÄ. By rozwiÄzaÄ ten problem, mostki mogÅyby
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">udawaÄ serwery
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">udawaÄ serwery
 internetowe</a> (HTTP lub HTTPS), gdy ÅÄczÄ siÄ z nimi programy do skanowania portÃw,
 a nie zachowywaÄ siÄ jak mostki do chwili, gdy uÅytkownik poda klucz specyficzny
 dla mostka.
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@
 
 <li>Nasze cele w opieraniu siÄ cenzurze to m.in. zapobieganie temu, by napastnik
 podglÄdajÄcy ruch Tora mÃgÅ <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint"
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint"
 >odrÃÅniÄ go od normalnego ruchu SSL</a>. OczywiÅcie, nie moÅemy osiÄgnÄÄ idealnej
 steganografii i dalej mieÄ uÅytecznÄ i dziaÅajÄcÄ sieÄ, ale w pierwszym kroku
 chcielibyÅmy blokowaÄ jakiekolwiek ataki, ktÃre mogÄ siÄ udaÄ po obserwacji tylko

Modified: website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>vÃdeo</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>slides</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html";>abstract</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
 e a palestra "Current events in 2007" de Roger, no 24C3 em dezembro
 de 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4";>vÃdeo</a>,
@@ -182,12 +182,12 @@
 <li>O <b>documento de design</b> (publicado na Usenix Security 2004)
 tem as nossas justificativas e anÃlise de seguranÃa para o design do Tor:
 estÃo disponÃveis versÃes em 
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
 <li>Nosso paper seguinte sobre <b>challenges in low-latency anonymity</b>
 ("desafios em anonimato de baixa latÃncia" - ainda em rascunho) detalha as
 experiÃncias e diretrizes mais recentes:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a>.</li>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Nosso paper da WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> (Anonimato Adora Companhia: Usabilidade e o
 Efeito Rede) &mdash; explica porque a usabilidade em sistemas de anonimato 
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@
 <li>Nosso design preliminar para dificultar o bloqueio de acesso à rede Tor por 
 grandes firewalls està descrito em 
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">rascunho em HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">rascunho em HTML</a>.
 Quer nos <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">ajudar a construÃ-lo</a>?</li>
 <li>As <b>especificaÃÃes</b> tÃm como objetivo dar aos desenvolvedores informaÃÃo
 suficiente para construir uma versÃo compatÃvel do Tor:

Modified: website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@
 
 <p>
 ÐÑÑÐÑÑÐÑÑÑ ÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÑÐÐÐÑÐ ÐÐÐÑÐÐÐÑ ÐÑÐÑÐÐÐÐÐ ÑÐÑÑÑÑÑ ÑÐÑÐÐÑÐÐ. ÐÐÑÐÑÐÑÐ
-ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐ <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">ÐÐÐÑÐÐÐÑ ÐÐ
+ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">ÐÐÐÑÐÐÐÑ ÐÐ
 ÐÑÑÐÑÐÐÑÑÑÐ ÑÐÑÐ Tor</a> ÐÐÑ ÐÐÐÑÑÐÐÐÑ ÐÐÐÐÐ ÑÐÐÑÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÑÐÑÐÐÑÐÐ ÐÐ
 ÐÑÑÐÑÐÐÑÑÑÐ Ð <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">ÑÐÐÑÐÑÐÐÐÑÐÑÑ ÑÐÑÐÐ
 ÑÐÐÑÑÐÐÐÐÐÑÐÐ</a> ÐÐÑ ÑÐÑÐÐÑÐÐ ÑÐÐÐÑÐÐÐÐ.

Modified: website/trunk/se/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/se/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/se/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -79,18 +79,18 @@
 <ul>
 <li><b>Design dokument</b> (publiserat p&aring; Usenix Security 2004)
 anger v&aring;ra sk&auml;l och s&auml;kerhetsanalys av Tors design:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> och
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> och
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 version finns.</li>
 <li>V&aring;r uppf&ouml;ljande artikel ang&aring;ende <b>utmaningar i l&aring;gf&ouml;rdr&ouml;jningsanonymitet</b>
 (fortfarande i utkast-format) anger i detalj de senaste erfarenheterna och inriktingar:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 version</a>.</li>
 
 <li>En preliminädesing fött gödet svåre fötora brandväar att
 hindra tillgå till Tor-näerket finns beskrivet i
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a>.
 Se ocksåa href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf";>bilder</a> och
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v";>video</a>
 fråRogers <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Home";>23C3 förag</a>.

Modified: website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
 Skill Level: <i>High</i>
 <br />
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
-Tor 0.2.0.xçåç<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">ääéèæè</a
+Tor 0.2.0.xçåç<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">ääéèæè</a
 >ææéäæææåæåæèççææçèåãäæ Tor çååæèèåæäæéäçéè
 æåçæåææèãæåïçå Tor åèåää åå/çå  åäèèçåï
 æ<a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">åèæåèäéå</a>ï
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
 çææèåäéèåèèæääååç Tor äæïåååé Tor åèåïåææåçååæçå
 åæååèè<a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt"> Tor çæ</a>ã
 èèåèäééïåååçåææååææçæåïçæåè
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">äèæää web æåå</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">äèæää web æåå</a>
 ïHTTPæèHTTPSïïåæåææææäæçççæ keyïéäåäääåæçççæèæååã
 <br />
 èéåçåäéèåéçççåèèãääååçæææïåäääæåèçéæäççæåæåï
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@
 </li>
 
 <!-- NEED HELP -->
-<li>æäååææåççæåæéææåè<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
+<li>æäååææåççæåæéææåè<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
 äæé SSL äèäåå Tor ææå</a>ãåææïæääåèæåååççéèåäæåçæïäæï
 éåïæäåæèåéææåèääèååäææåååäååæåãåèäæåäïæääæäææèèååæèç
 ééæïTor çææåæä512åèäåäçïåæïäèçææååäæ512åèçåæãåçççèäï