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[tor-commits] r24435: {website} include stable man page from the old website (in website/trunk/docs: ar en fr my pl ru)



Author: runa
Date: 2011-03-25 13:08:28 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011)
New Revision: 24435

Modified:
   website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi
   website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi
   website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml
   website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi
   website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi
   website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi
   website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi
Log:
include stable man page from the old website

Modified: website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
           {'url'  => 'docs/running-a-mirror',
            'txt'  => 'ØØØ ÙØØØ',
           },
-#          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
-#           'txt'  => 'ØÙØ- ØÙÙÙ ØÙØØØØØØ ØÙØØØØØ',
-#          },
+          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
+           'txt'  => 'ØÙØ- ØÙÙÙ ØÙØØØØØØ ØÙØØØØØ',
+          },
           {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual-dev',
            'txt'  => 'ØÙØ- ØÙÙÙ ØÙØØØØØØ ØÙÙØ',
           },

Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
           {'url'  => 'docs/running-a-mirror',
            'txt'  => 'Configuring a Mirror',
           },
-#          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
-#           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
-#          },
+          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
+           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
+          },
           {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual-dev',
            'txt'  => 'Tor -alpha Manual',
           },

Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -9,22 +9,2321 @@
   <div id="breadcrumbs">
     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>
     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
-    <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Dev Manual</a>
+    <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Manual</a>
   </div>
-  <div id="maincol">  
-    <:
-    	die "Missing git clone at $(TORGIT)" unless -d "$(TORGIT)";
-    	my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - -`;
-    	die "No manpage because of asciidoc error or file not available from git" unless $man;
-    	print $man;
-    :>
-  </div>
+  <div id="maincol">
+	<h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2>
+	<div class="sectionbody">
+			<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>tor</strong> [<em>OPTION</em> <em>value</em>]&#8230;</p>
+			</div>
+	</div>
+		<h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2>
+		<div class="sectionbody">
+			<div class="paragraph"><p><em>tor</em> is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
+			service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
+			negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node 
+			knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down 
+			the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
+			the downstream node.<br /></p></div>
+			
+			<div class="paragraph"><p>Basically <em>tor</em> provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").
+			Users bounce their TCP streams&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;around the
+			routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have 
+			difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</p></div>
+		</div>
+		<h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2>
+		<div class="sectionbody">
+			<div class="dlist"><dl>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>-h</strong>, <strong>-help</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Display a short help message and exit.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>-f</strong> <em>FILE</em>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--hash-password</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Generates a hashed password for control port access.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--list-fingerprint</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--verify-config</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Verify the configuration file is valid.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--nt-service</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    <strong>--service [install|remove|start|stop]</strong> Manage the Tor Windows
+					    NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at
+					    <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService";>https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a>
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--list-torrc-options</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    List all valid options.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--version</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Display Tor version and exit.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>--quiet</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.
+					    (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to
+					    the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				</dl>
+			</div>
+			<div class="paragraph">
+				<p>Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
+    				value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").
+				Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside
+				quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over
+    				options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To
+    				split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before
+    				the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but
+    				they must start at the beginning of a line.</p>
+			</div>
+			<div class="dlist"><dl>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>BandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to
+					    the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
+					    bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the
+					    public network, this needs to be <em>at the very least</em> 20 KB (that is,
+					    20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>BandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
+				    	    number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
+					    BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
+					    who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
+					    advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
+					    without impacting network performance.
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>RelayBandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
+					    usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
+					    per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
+					    Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
+					    requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>RelayBandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
+					    _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
+					    (Default: 0)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>ConnLimit</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
+					    process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
+					    descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
+					    If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.<br />
+					    <br />
+					    You probably don&#8217;t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows
+					    since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
+					</p>
+				</dd>
+				<dt class="hdlist1">
+					<strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+				</dt>
+				<dd>
+					<p>
+					    If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
+					    sockets to the size specified in <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong>. This is useful for
+					    virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
+					    be limited. If you&#8217;re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
+					    creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
+					    likely experiencing this problem.<br />
+					    <br />
+					    The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
+					    the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
+					    this configuration option is a second-resort.<br />
+					    <br />
+					    The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
+					    cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
+					    the problem.<br />
+					    <br />
+					    You should <strong>not</strong> enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
+					    space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
+					    the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
+					    time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
+					</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    When <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
+						    all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
+						    262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>ControlPort</strong> <em>Port</em>
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
+						    connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
+						    (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
+						    <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> or <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong>, setting this option will
+						    cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This
+						    option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>ControlListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind
+						    to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly
+						    recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you&#8217;re doing,
+						    since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
+						    dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple
+						    times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>ControlSocket</strong> <em>Path</em>
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
+						    socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> <em>hashed_password</em>
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    Don&#8217;t allow any connections on the control port except when the other
+						    process knows the password whose one-way hash is <em>hashed_password</em>. You
+						    can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
+						    <em>password</em>". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
+						    than one HashedControlPassword line.
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>CookieAuthentication</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    If this option is set to 1, don&#8217;t allow any connections on the control port
+						    except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
+						    "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
+						    authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
+						    security. (Default: 0)
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+						<strong>CookieAuthFile</strong> <em>Path</em>
+					</dt>
+					<dd>
+						<p>
+						    If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
+						    for Tor&#8217;s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
+						</p>
+					</dd>
+					<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>CookieAuthFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<em>Groupname</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If this option is set to 0, don&#8217;t allow the filesystem group to read the
+    cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
+    the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
+    implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DataDirectory</strong> <em>DIR</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DirServer</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
+    and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
+    many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
+    separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
+    is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style
+    directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is
+    provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)
+    directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will
+    use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"
+    flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is <strong>not</strong> set.
+    Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
+    "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=<strong>port</strong>" is given, Tor will use the
+    given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a
+    flag "v3ident=<strong>fp</strong>" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
+    whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint <strong>fp</strong>.<br />
+<br />
+    If no <strong>dirserver</strong> line is given, Tor will use the default directory
+    servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
+    network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
+    distinguishable from other users, because you won&#8217;t believe the same
+    authorities they do.
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateDirAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>
+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateHSAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AlternateBridgeAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em> fingerprint</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using
+    AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
+    leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.
+    Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service
+    authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FetchDirInfoEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
+    directory caches, even if you don&#8217;t meet the normal criteria for fetching
+    early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FetchHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
+    rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you&#8217;re using a Tor
+    controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FetchServerDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
+    descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
+    you&#8217;re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
+    (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FetchUselessDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
+    authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless
+    descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is
+    useful if you&#8217;re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor
+    nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HTTPProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
+    if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
+    servers.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HTTPProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
+    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
+    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
+    want it to support others.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
+    host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
+    directly to servers. You may want to set <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> to restrict
+    the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
+    allows connecting to certain ports.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HTTPSProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
+    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
+    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
+    want it to support others.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>KeepalivePeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
+    every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
+    has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
+    idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Send all messages between <em>minSeverity</em> and <em>maxSeverity</em> to the standard
+    output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
+    "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
+    debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
+    since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
+    attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
+    messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
+    "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
+    Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
+    level.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>OutboundBindAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
+    is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
+    of Tor&#8217;s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be
+    ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>PidFile</strong> <em>FILE</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
+    FILE.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ProtocolWarnings</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not
+    following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
+    'info'. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>RunAsDaemon</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
+    on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
+    (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SafeLogging</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
+    addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
+    still be useful, but they don&#8217;t leave behind personally identifying
+    information about what sites a user might have visited.<br />
+<br />
+    If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
+    set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>User</strong> <em>UID</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HardwareAccel</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
+    available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AvoidDiskWrites</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
+    This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
+    only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TunnelDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build
+    a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.
+    (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>PreferTunneledDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don&#8217;t support tunneled
+    directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
+<strong>SocksPort</strong> is non-zero):</p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AllowInvalidNodes</strong> <strong>entry</strong>|<strong>exit</strong>|<strong>middle</strong>|<strong>introduction</strong>|<strong>rendezvous</strong>|<strong>&#8230;</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
+    authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it&#8217;s not
+    recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
+    can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
+    "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ExcludeSingleHopRelays</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
+    the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set
+    to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at
+    higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally
+    included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option,
+    so using these relays might make your client stand out.
+    (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>Bridge</strong> <em>IP</em>:<em>ORPort</em> [fingerprint]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
+    "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
+    is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
+    the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
+    fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
+    it&#8217;s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>CircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
+    open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>CircuitIdleTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then
+    close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all
+    of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up
+    making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we&#8217;re
+    receiving, it won&#8217;t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1
+    hour.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ClientOnly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
+    directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is
+    configured. (Usually, you don&#8217;t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at
+    figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a
+    useful server.) (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ExcludeNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:
+    ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ExcludeExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any
+    node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
+    list.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>EntryNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address
+    patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are
+    treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These
+    are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>StrictEntryNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for
+    the first hop of a circuit.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>StrictExitNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for
+    the last hop of a circuit.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FascistFirewall</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
+    that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <strong>FirewallPorts</strong>).
+    This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
+    restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
+    a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
+    ReachableAddresses instead.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FirewallPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
+    <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
+    instead. (Default: 80, 443)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HidServAuth</strong> <em>onion-address</em> <em>auth-cookie</em> [<em>service-name</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
+    characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
+    characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
+    purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
+    for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
+    this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
+    services can be configured to require authorization using the
+    <strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> option.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
+    you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
+    that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
+    example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
+    *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
+    99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
+    80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
+    these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
+    GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
+    <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> is set then these
+    connections will go through that proxy.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
+    these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
+    set explicitly then the value of <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If
+    <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> is set then these connections will go through that proxy.<br />
+<br />
+    The separation between <strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> and
+    <strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> is only interesting when you are connecting
+    through proxies (see <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> and <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong>). Most proxies limit
+    TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
+    and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
+    information) to port 80.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>LongLivedPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
+    (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
+    ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
+    will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,
+    5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>MapAddress</strong> <em>address</em> <em>newaddress</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress
+    before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
+    www.indymedia.org to exit via <em>torserver</em> (where <em>torserver</em> is the
+    nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org
+    www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NewCircuitPeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
+    seconds)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>MaxCircuitDirtiness</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
+    but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10
+    minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NodeFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
+    constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
+    any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
+    when a server doesn&#8217;t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
+    can be used multiple times.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>EnforceDistinctSubnets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
+    the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
+    the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SocksPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
+    applications. Set this to 0 if you don&#8217;t want to allow application
+    connections. (Default: 9050)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SocksListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
+    applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.
+    192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
+    to multiple addresses/ports.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SocksPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
+    SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
+    policies below.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SocksTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
+    unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
+    2 minutes.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TrackHostExits</strong> <em>host</em>,<em>.domain</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
+    connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
+    exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as
+    matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means
+    match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
+    that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
+    your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
+    of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
+    user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
+    through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TrackHostExitsExpire</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
+    association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
+    1800 seconds (30 minutes).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>UpdateBridgesFromAuthority</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
+    from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
+    a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>UseBridges</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
+    config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
+    guards. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>UseEntryGuards</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
+    to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
+    increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
+    fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NumEntryGuards</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
+    as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
+    use unsafe variants of the socks protocol&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;ones that only provide an IP
+    address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
+    Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
+    (Defaults to 0.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
+    each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
+    safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
+    helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
+    DNS requests. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> <em>Address</em>/<em>bits</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
+    command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
+    picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:
+    127.192.0.0/10)<br />
+<br />
+    When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
+    like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or
+    "172.16.0.0/12". The default <strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> address range on a
+    properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For
+    local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
+    characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
+    resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
+    (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FastFirstHopPK</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
+    hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
+    already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
+    keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.<br />
+<br />
+    Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it&#8217;s
+    operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it
+    doesn&#8217;t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TransPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on <em>PORT</em> (by convention,
+    9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
+    Linux&#8217;s IPTables. If you&#8217;re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
+    a network, you&#8217;ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
+    default setting. You&#8217;ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for
+    the network you&#8217;d like to proxy. (Default: 0).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TransListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:
+    127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an
+    entire network.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NATDPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.)
+    to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is
+    only for people who cannot use TransPort.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NATDListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
+    that ends with one of the suffixes in <strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong>, we map an
+    unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
+    This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
+    resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong> <em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with <strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong>.
+    The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DNSPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves
+    them anonymously. (Default: 0).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DNSListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
+    tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
+    192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don&#8217;t
+    turn it off unless you know what you&#8217;re doing. (Default: 1).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DownloadExtraInfo</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
+    contain information about servers other than the information in their
+    regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
+    itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>FallbackNetworkstatusFile</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If Tor doesn&#8217;t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this
+    one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to
+    learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn&#8217;t need to put load on the
+    authorities. (Default: None).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>WarnPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
+    connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
+    to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
+    23,109,110,143).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>RejectPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
+    will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None).
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_server_options">SERVER OPTIONS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
+is non-zero):</p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>Address</strong> <em>address</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g.
+    moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP
+    address.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AllowSingleHopExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop
+    proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
+    the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use
+    servers that set this option, since most clients have
+    ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AssumeReachable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
+    don&#8217;t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
+    immediately. If <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> is also set, this option
+    instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
+    all connected servers as running.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>BridgeRelay</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
+    from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
+    server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay
+    descriptor to the public directory authorities.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ContactInfo</strong> <em>email_address</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked
+    up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it&#8217;s an
+    email address.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ExitPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
+    "<strong>accept</strong>|<strong>reject</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]". If /<em>MASK</em> is
+    omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
+    a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).
+    <em>PORT</em> can be a single port number, an interval of ports
+    "<em>FROM_PORT</em>-<em>TO_PORT</em>", or "*". If <em>PORT</em> is omitted, that means
+    "*".<br />
+<br />
+    For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
+    reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
+    anything else.<br />
+<br />
+    To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
+    169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
+    172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
+    These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
+    policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
+    ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you&#8217;ve done
+    that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
+    internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that
+    may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
+    public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
+    about internal and reserved IP address space.<br />
+<br />
+    This directive can be specified multiple times so you don&#8217;t have to put it
+    all on one line.<br />
+<br />
+    Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
+    want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
+    either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you&#8217;re _augmenting_
+    (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:<br />
+</p>
+<div class="literalblock">
+<div class="content">
+<pre><tt>reject *:25^M
+reject *:119^M
+reject *:135-139^M
+reject *:445^M
+reject *:563^M
+reject *:1214^M
+reject *:4661-4666^M
+reject *:6346-6429^M
+reject *:6699^M
+reject *:6881-6999^M
+accept *:*</tt></pre>
+</div></div>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ExitPolicyRejectPrivate</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address,
+    at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy.
+    (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>MaxOnionsPending</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject
+    new ones. (Default: 100)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>MyFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or
+    organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by
+    their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare
+    that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the
+    same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its
+    family; it doesn&#8217;t need to list itself, but it won&#8217;t hurt.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>Nickname</strong> <em>name</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Set the server&#8217;s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
+    characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NumCPUs</strong> <em>num</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ORPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ORListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
+    servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
+    specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified
+    multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>PublishServerDescriptor</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>v1</strong>|<strong>v2</strong>|<strong>v3</strong>|<strong>bridge</strong>,<strong>&#8230;</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
+    a relay. You can
+    choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
+<br />
+    If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
+    descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you&#8217;re testing
+    out your server, or if you&#8217;re using a Tor controller that handles directory
+    publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all
+    type(s) specified. The default is "1",
+    which means "if running as a server, publish the
+    appropriate descriptors to the authorities".
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ShutdownWaitLength</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When we get a SIGINT and we&#8217;re a server, we begin shutting down:
+    we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After <strong>NUM</strong>
+    seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi-
+    ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AccountingMax</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>|<strong>TB</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting
+    period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with
+    AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB
+    and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1
+    GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new
+    connections and circuits. When the number of bytes
+    is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
+    time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at
+    the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period
+    before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation
+    is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
+    collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more
+    useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available".
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AccountingStart</strong> <strong>day</strong>|<strong>week</strong>|<strong>month</strong> [<em>day</em>] <em>HH:MM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Specify how long accounting periods last. If <strong>month</strong> is given, each
+    accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> on the <em>dayth</em> day of one
+    month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and
+    28.) If <strong>week</strong> is given, each accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em>
+    of the <em>dayth</em> day of one week to the same day and time of the next week,
+    with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If <strong>day</strong> is given, each
+    accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> each day to the same time on
+    the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
+    "month 1 0:00".)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSResolvConfFile</strong> <em>filename</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
+    <em>filename</em>. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
+    "<strong>resolv.conf</strong>" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
+    only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
+    (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
+    parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
+    Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
+    it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSSearchDomains</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
+    For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
+    "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
+    connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
+    your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSDetectHijacking</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
+    whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
+    requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
+    correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
+    on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSTestAddresses</strong> <em>address</em>,<em>address</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When we&#8217;re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these <em>valid</em> addresses
+    aren&#8217;t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
+    and we&#8217;ll reset our exit policy to "reject <strong>:</strong>". This option only affects
+    name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to
+    "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
+    containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
+    exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
+    URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
+    on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>BridgeRecordUsageByCountry</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
+    GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client
+    addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
+    which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>ServerDNSRandomizeCase</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
+    outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
+    This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
+    For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
+    0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
+    does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>GeoIPFile</strong> <em>filename</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_directory_server_options">DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is,
+if DirPort is non-zero):</p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
+    server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
+    good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
+    already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
+    to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at
+    <a href="mailto:tor-ops@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx";>tor-ops@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx</a> if you think you should be a directory.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DirPortFrontPage</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
+    the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
+    to set up a separate webserver. There&#8217;s a sample disclaimer in
+    contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V1AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
+    generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
+    Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V2AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
+    generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
+    described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running
+    0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V3AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
+    generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
+    described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at
+    least 0.2.0.x).
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
+    Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
+    version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
+    authorities provide this service optionally. See <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>,
+    <strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong>, and <strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong>.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
+    opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
+    opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
+    the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint
+    has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to
+    accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See
+    <strong>approved-routers</strong> in the <strong>FILES</strong> section below.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set in addition to
+    <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor also accepts and serves hidden
+    service descriptors. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HSAuthorityRecordStats</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong>,
+    Tor periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service
+    usage to a file <strong>hsusage</strong> in its data directory. (Default:
+    0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HidServDirectoryV2</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
+    descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
+    connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>BridgeAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
+    accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
+    networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
+    authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DirPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Advertise the directory service on this port.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DirListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to
+    this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
+    This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
+    addresses/ports.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DirPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
+    directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_directory_authority_server_options">DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
+    safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
+    directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
+    multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
+    this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should be set too.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
+    safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
+    directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>
+    is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should
+    be set too.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
+    safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
+    directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>
+    is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should
+    be set too.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>DirAllowPrivateAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
+    elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
+    address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirBadDir</strong> <em>AddressPattern&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this
+    authority publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> is set.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirBadExit</strong> <em>AddressPattern&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
+    publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> is set.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirInvalid</strong> <em>AddressPattern&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
+    authority publishes.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirReject</strong> <em>AddressPattern</em>&#8230;
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
+    authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
+    submitted for publication by this authority.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
+    opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set
+    this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;
+    otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared
+    directory.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
+    opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
+    1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
+    effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirRejectUnlisted</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects
+    all uploaded server descriptors that aren&#8217;t explicitly listed in the
+    fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil
+    attack. (Default: 0)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
+    list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
+    (Default: 2)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies
+    to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V3AuthVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server&#8217;s preferred voting
+    interval. Note that voting will <em>actually</em> happen at an interval chosen
+    by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
+    SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V3AuthVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server&#8217;s preferred delay
+    between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
+    other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server&#8217;s
+    preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V3AuthDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server&#8217;s preferred delay
+    between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
+    signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
+    is not the server&#8217;s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
+    (Default: 5 minutes.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>V3AuthNIntervalsValid</strong> <em>NUM</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
+    for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
+    increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
+    directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
+    server&#8217;s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
+    least 2. (Default: 3.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_hidden_service_options">HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used to configure a hidden service.</p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HiddenServiceDir</strong> <em>DIRECTORY</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
+    must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
+    specify multiple services.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HiddenServicePort</strong> <em>VIRTPORT</em> [<em>TARGET</em>]
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
+    option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
+    recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
+    the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or
+    both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
+    multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
+    VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>PublishHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won&#8217;t
+    advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
+    you&#8217;re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
+    (Default: 1)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HiddenServiceVersion</strong> <em>version</em>,<em>version</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
+    service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> <em>auth-type</em> <em>client-name</em>,<em>client-name</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
+    only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose
+    authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
+    hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
+    listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
+    are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
+    spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
+    clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
+    found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
+    their configuration file using <strong>HidServAuth</strong>.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>RendPostPeriod</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
+    service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
+    uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_testing_network_options">TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.</p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
+    so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
+    non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
+    (Default: 0)<br />
+</p>
+<div class="literalblock">
+<div class="content">
+<pre><tt>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1^M
+DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1^M
+EnforceDistinctSubnets 0^M
+AssumeReachable 1^M
+AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0^M
+AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0^M
+ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0^M
+ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0^M
+V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes^M
+V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds^M
+V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds^M
+TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes^M
+TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds^M
+TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds^M
+TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes^M
+TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes</tt></pre>
+</div></div>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
+    consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
+    <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
+    the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
+    <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
+    the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
+    <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
+    are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
+    that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
+    time. Changing this requires that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default:
+    10 minutes)
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_signals">SIGNALS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>Tor catches the following signals:</p></div>
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGTERM</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGINT</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
+    slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
+    (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGHUP</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
+    reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGUSR1</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGUSR2</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
+    sending a SIGHUP.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGCHLD</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
+    can clean up.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGPIPE</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>SIGXFSZ</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_files">FILES</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="dlist"><dl>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>@CONFDIR@/torrc</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<strong>@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The tor process stores keys and other data here.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-status/</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.
+    Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal
+    identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-descriptors</strong> and <strong>cached-descriptors.new</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
+    than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
+    beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
+    a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
+    too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-routers</strong> and <strong>cached-routers.new</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
+    Tor can&#8217;t find the newer files, it looks here instead.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/state</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
+    the file. These include:
+</p>
+<div class="ulist"><ul>
+<li>
+<p>
+The current entry guards and their status.
+</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>
+The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
+            below).
+</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>
+When the file was last written
+</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>
+What version of Tor generated the state file
+</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>
+A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router
+            descriptors.
+</p>
+</li>
+</ul></div>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/bw_accounting</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
+    and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
+    is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only
+    used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/control_auth_cookie</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
+    overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
+    control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is
+    enabled.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/keys/</strong>*
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/fingerprint</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server&#8217;s identity key.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/approved-routers</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
+    <strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong>). This file lists nickname to identity
+    bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by
+    whitespace. See your <strong>fingerprint</strong> file in the <em>DataDirectory</em> for an
+    example line. If the nickname is <strong>!reject</strong> then descriptors from the
+    given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
+    <strong>!invalid</strong> then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
+    not valid, that is, not recommended.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/router-stability</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
+    router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
+    how to set their Stable flags.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/hostname</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The &lt;base32-encoded-fingerprint&gt;.onion domain name for this hidden service.
+    If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
+    also contains authorization data for all clients.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/private_key</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    The private key for this hidden service.
+</p>
+</dd>
+<dt class="hdlist1">
+<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/client_keys</strong>
+</dt>
+<dd>
+<p>
+    Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
+    authorized clients.
+</p>
+</dd>
+</dl></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_see_also">SEE ALSO</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>privoxy</strong>(1), <strong>tsocks</strong>(1), <strong>torify</strong>(1)<br /></p></div>
+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>https://www.torproject.org/</strong></p></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_bugs">BUGS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.</p></div>
+</div>
+<h2 id="_authors">AUTHORS</h2>
+<div class="sectionbody">
+<div class="paragraph"><p>Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].</p></div>
+</div>
+</div>
   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
-  <div id = "sidecol">
+<div id = "sidecol">
 #include "side.wmi"
 #include "info.wmi"
-  </div>
-  <!-- END SIDECOL -->
 </div>
+<!-- END SIDECOL -->
+</div>
 <!-- END CONTENT -->
-#include <foot.wmi>  
+#include <foot.wmi>

Modified: website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
           {'url'  => 'docs/running-a-mirror',
            'txt'  => 'Configuring a Mirror',
           },
-#          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
-#           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
-#          },
+          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
+           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
+          },
           {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual-dev',
            'txt'  => 'Tor -alpha Manual',
           },

Modified: website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
           {'url'  => 'docs/running-a-mirror',
            'txt'  => 'Configuring a Mirror',
           },
-#          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
-#           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
-#          },
+          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
+           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
+          },
           {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual-dev',
            'txt'  => 'Tor -alpha Manual',
           },

Modified: website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
           {'url'  => 'docs/running-a-mirror',
            'txt'  => 'Configuring a Mirror',
           },
-#          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
-#           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
-#          },
+          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
+           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
+          },
           {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual-dev',
            'txt'  => 'Tor -alpha Manual',
           },

Modified: website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434)
+++ website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi	2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
           {'url'  => 'docs/running-a-mirror',
            'txt'  => 'Configuring a Mirror',
           },
-#          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
-#           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
-#          },
+          {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual',
+           'txt'  => 'Tor -stable Manual',
+          },
           {'url'  => 'docs/tor-manual-dev',
            'txt'  => 'Tor -alpha Manual',
           },

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