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[or-cvs] point to a paper that might help



Update of /home2/or/cvsroot/website
In directory moria:/home/arma/work/onion/cvs/website

Modified Files:
	volunteer.html 
Log Message:
point to a paper that might help


Index: volunteer.html
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RCS file: /home2/or/cvsroot/website/volunteer.html,v
retrieving revision 1.21
retrieving revision 1.22
diff -u -d -r1.21 -r1.22
--- volunteer.html	22 Sep 2005 03:21:56 -0000	1.21
+++ volunteer.html	22 Sep 2005 03:31:06 -0000	1.22
@@ -227,14 +227,16 @@
 or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,
 and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from
 a successful defense in each case?</li>
-<li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack": by watching traffic at
-Alice and at Bob, we can compare traffic signatures and become convinced
-that we're watching the same stream. So far Tor accepts this as a fact
-of life and assumes this attack is trivial in all cases. First of all,
-is that actually true? How much traffic of what sort of distribution is
-needed before the adversary is confident he has won? Are there scenarios
-(e.g. not transmitting much) that slow down the attack? Do some traffic
-padding or traffic shaping schemes work better than others?</li>
+<li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
+by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004";>compare
+traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
+stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
+attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
+much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
+is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
+that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
+schemes work better than others?</li>
 <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
 the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
 exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,