On Sun, Jul 29, 2007 at 06:13:45PM -0400, arma@xxxxxxxx wrote: > Author: arma > Date: 2007-07-29 18:13:44 -0400 (Sun, 29 Jul 2007) > New Revision: 10974 > > Modified: > tor/trunk/ChangeLog > tor/trunk/doc/spec/proposals/111-local-traffic-priority.txt > tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c > tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c > tor/trunk/src/or/command.c > tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c > tor/trunk/src/or/or.h > tor/trunk/src/or/relay.c > Log: > Be even more aggressive about separating local traffic from relayed > traffic when RelayBandwidthRate is set. (Refines proposal 111.) [...] > + Option 4: put both classes of circuits over a single connection, and > + keep track of the last time we read or wrote a high-priority cell. If > + it's been less than N seconds, give the whole connection high priority, > + else give the whole connection low priority. Hm. Is it a problem that this approach makes it trivial for an attacker to tell when you've been online recently (to about the nearest second), and to learn your guard nodes? This seems somehow worse than the partitioning problem with "option 2", since this is something anybody can do remotely, rather than requiring the attacker to eavesdrop or be one of your guards. -- Nick Mathewson
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