On Fri, 2006-08-18 at 20:49 -0700, Anothony Georgeo wrote: > Hi, > > I have been thinking about the issue of exit node > operators and/or adversaries sniffing clear-text > ingress/egress traffic locally and/or remotly on an > exit node. I have a possible solution but I would > like the Tor devs. and experts here to weigh-in. In this thread I saw no mention of partitioning attack problems. In the past the Mixnet networks that allow several visible parameter to be chosen by the user (i.e. Mixmaster) was considered vulnerable to partitioning attack, that can make traffic analisys easier, lowering the anonimity set. The parameters can be some non-default remailer properties, some fixed user-chosen chains, or the location diversity in Autonomous System domain. I read that is generally agreed that traffic analisys is the main road to attack low-latency systems like Tor. It is possible that give a lot of hand-configurable parameter and stressing the necessity of a personal, "smart" choice (exit router enter router forbidden router and so on) this can make traffic analisys a lot easier respect a no-user-configurable-parameters situation ? JM2C Ciao. Marco -- +--------------- http://www.winstonsmith.info ---------------+ | il Progetto Winston Smith: scolleghiamo il Grande Fratello | | the Winston Smith Project: unplug the Big Brother | | Marco A. Calamari marcoc@xxxxxxxxx http://www.marcoc.it | | DSS/DH: 8F3E 5BAE 906F B416 9242 1C10 8661 24A9 BFCE 822B | + PGP RSA: ED84 3839 6C4D 3FFE 389F 209E 3128 5698 ----------+
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