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Re: following on from today's discussion
- To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: following on from today's discussion
- From: Jay Goodman Tamboli <jay@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 13:20:37 -0400
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- Delivery-date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 13:21:28 -0400
- In-reply-to: <200608211806.31161.robert@roberthogan.net>
- References: <200608182214.29398.robert@roberthogan.net> <1E045D0B-A60C-4DD3-BD3A-E053832FF350@tamboli.cx> <20060820221935.GB4253@nodewarrior.org> <200608211806.31161.robert@roberthogan.net>
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(moving back to or-talk)
On 2006.08.21, at 13:06, Robert Hogan wrote:
On Sunday 20 August 2006 23:19, Chris Palmer wrote:
Jay Goodman Tamboli writes:
Is it true that your traffic is more likely to be eavesdropped upon?
We can only speculate. End-to-end encryption...
It's not a matter of speculation. Using Tor expands the number of
potential
eavesdroppers by at least the number of exit nodes in the Tor network.
While it's true the number of potential eavesdroppers across all
connections increases that much, the number of potential
eavesdroppers for any one connection or at any single time would seem
to increase only a little. That is, without Tor you have your ISP and
whatever computers are between it and your destination, and with Tor
you have the exit node operator, his ISP, and whatever computers are
between it and your destination. Whether the exit node operator is
likely to eavesdrop is, I think, speculation.
/jgt
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