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AllowInvalidNodes entry, exit, ... ?



What are the real risks about this?

.. when the adversary could be also a big-bro-s ...

I am testing my tor client enabling AllowInvalidNodes entry,middle,introduction,rendezvous, as I think this is the way we have to go for a global tor network privacy/security, as I don't trust (till some one convinces me otherwise) the "valid nodes" validators, that may be more easily compromised by big brother-s. As an adversary, I prefer a wild mix of tor exit nodes (sane + compromised mix ones) than only "valid" exit nodes, from countries that for sure are compromised by big-bro-s.

Using "valid nodes" I have noticed too many times mu browsing is going to the same exit nodes .... yes fast, but always the same tor exit nodes "club".

Of course, non valid exit nodes may be bad-boys, I know.

A good twek against this could be to use a free or paid bunch of ssl/socks last non-tor exit-node (paid via anonymous payments as pecunix or so with no javascript, etc. for a real anonymity), this policy should be ok?

Any light on this matter very welcome!

Mac.