Am Samstag, den 06.12.2008, 19:49 -0500 schrieb Gregory Maxwell:
> http://community.zdnet.co.uk/blog/0,1000000567,10009938o-2000331777b,00.htm?new_comment
>
> I've confirmed the reports of UK ISPs censoring Wikipedia using some
> UK tor exists.
I think it's time to find a better technical solution to deal with
censorship in different countries.
Censorship is increasing all around the world and we should be prepared
that sooner or later nearly every country will censor the internet for
different reasons (cp, intellectual property, politcal reasons, etc.)
and in a different way.
A perfect technical solution would make it possible to request any
ressource as long as there is just one exit-node which isn't affected by
censorship.
But at the moment TOR-Nodes doesn't know which ressources are censored
and which really doesn't exist, so it can happen that you use a circuit
which is not able to bypass censorship.
Putting them on the bad-exit-list is no solution, because first that way
they are lost for the network for all requests which are not censored at
all, and second the specific user has to know that the requested
ressource does exist, which nodes are able to access it and how he can
force TOR to do so.
This could be done better: TOR itself should know which nodes are
affected by censorship and use another for the specific request.
The list could be auto-generated by the exit-nodes. For example an exit
which gets back a 404 or a negative DNS-result could simply ask some
other exit nodes (in a different country) to check if this is "real" or
censorship. If last one, the specific request could be put on a list and
published to the directory.
Other TOR-Servers could use this list to check if they are also
affected; clients would be able to check if the existing circuit is
affected for the specific request and build up a different one.
Not every censorship would be recognized this way, but for the other
ones there could be a button implemented to TOR-Client. If pressed, the
TOR-Exit is forced by the user to do the check.
A nice side-effect is, that we get the neccessary data to check the
censor which could be useful at least in democratic countries which have
no public lists ('cause of index liborium prohibitum).
So far,
B.
--
Surf anonymously and reach Hidden Services by using TOR, JonDos (JAP)
and I2P with https://tor-proxy.net .
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