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Re: [tor-talk] Padding effective against simple passive end-to-end correlation attacks?



So what you're basically saying is that you are more secure and anonymous
if you run your Tor connection as a always on relay and access the Tor
network via that relay?

On Saturday, January 26, 2013, adrelanos wrote:

> I'll make a simple example to demonstrate the point.
>
> Alice lives in country with few Tor users. Let's take Uganda as random
> example from the Tor metrics page. There are between ~40 and ~120 Tor
> users per day from that country. [1] Alice likes to read a local forum
> and she posts in her local dialect.
>
> Behavior A:
> Alice always starts Tor every day around the time of xx:xx:xx and checks
> a forum and posts.
>
> Behavior B:
> 1.) Open a Tor connection.
> 3.) Transfer some cover/dummy traffic. The longer the better?
> 4.) After some time check doing the stuff. (Ex: check mail, go on
> irc, post on forum) - Or at some random days, not doing any stuff,
> supposed to be hidden.
> 5.) Transfer more cover/dummy traffic. The longer the better?
> 6.) Close Tor connection.
>
> Adversary skills:
> - Forcing the country's ISP's to log when and for how long someone
> connects to the Tor network.
> - Surveillance of the local forum, watching the forum post time stamps.
> - The adversary compares the time stamp with the the public viewable
> time stamp of the forum post.
> - The adversary can watch the amount of encrypted traffic between Alice
> and the entry guard.
>
> Question:
> Isn't it significantly more difficult for the adversary to find out who
> is behind Alice's actions, when choosing Behavior B? It gets more
> difficult than just comparing time stamps?
>
> [1]
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&start=2012-10-28&end=2013-01-26&country=ug&events=off#direct-users
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Andrew Paolucci
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