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Re: [tor-talk] [tor-dev] Proposal 271: Another algorithm for guard selection
Hi,
Nick Mathewson:
uniformly at random
What does this mean!
an adversary who had (k/N) of the network would deanonymize
F=(k/N)^2 of all circuits...
and after a given user had built C circuits, the attacker
would see them at least once with probability 1-(1-F)^C.
With large C, the attacker would get a sample of every
user's traffic with probability 1.
Probabilistic risk analysis (imaginary math).
To prevent this from happening, Tor clients choose a small
number of guard nodes (currently 3)
Except that imaginary math cannot prevent anything XD
we can't continue to connect to the Tor network
unconditionally.
The conditions set herein create a hierarchical system of trust amongst
the guards, potentially reducing the likelihood that the selected guards
are malicious, correct?
Tor should make a best attempt at discovering
You mean *deciding*.
appropriate behavior, with as little user input and
configuration as possible.
How can Tor know what the users wants?
And, when it comes to what the software does, how do you bridge/close
the gap of understanding between those using and those working on Tor?
Wordlife,
Spencer
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