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Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,



On 2016-06-05 18:43, Paul Syverson wrote:
On Sun, Jun 05, 2016 at 05:20:24PM -0400, Allen wrote:
>
> So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits the
> network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received or
> another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to correlate the
> traffic right?


IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each node, not just entering and exiting the network. A mathematical model would be needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would be enough). The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it could
chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.

You guys might want to look at the stop-and-go mix paper (Kesdogan et al. 1998) and the alpha mixing paper (Dingledine et al. 2006) at freehaven.net/anonbib/
Other topics touched on in this thread include defensive dropping
"Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems" Levine et al. 2004,
also at anonbib.
There are many research papers that have explored aspects of these ideas.


It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node, with each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel one
route, while inbound packets travel a different route.

For this you might look at
"Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication"
Johnson et al. 2010, also on anonbib

aloha,
Paul

I just downloaded the PDF and will read it later tonight.
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