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Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,



On 2016-06-05 16:34, notfriendly@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
On 2016-06-05 17:20, Allen wrote:

So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits the network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received or another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to correlate the
traffic right?


IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each node, not just entering and exiting the network. A mathematical model would be needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would be enough). The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it could
chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.

It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node, with each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel one
route, while inbound packets travel a different route.

That's a good idea. If we could get a system of micro delays which
wouldn't cause major issues it'd be nice in protecting Tor users
anonymity. It's an issue that has been acknowledged by the tor project
but we haven't been able to find a working system yet. I think it's
more important then ever that we begin to address these issues.

I have had the idea of randomized micro delays between each node for long time, but have been told by many in the Tor community that this is bad idea for low latency network. I know that Tor has stated in past that they don't claim to protect from a GPA. But we must realize that the true threat is a GPA which must be dealt with by collaborating on solutions to protect from global view traffic analysis. Another idea, if micro delays would not work out for low latency anonymizing networks such as Tor would be to perhaps add padding, randomized padding between each node. If micro-delays and/or padding is bad idea, then other solutions should be discussed.

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