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Re: Tor and Firefox 3
I am a linux user, therefore I am not interested in xerobank products.
If Xerobank decides to setup there service for linux I may be
interested in the future. I do appreciate anonym's response, thankyou.
Any other ideas for replacing torbutton until torbutton fixes there
addon for firefox 3?
On Thu, Mar 13, 2008 at 11:39 PM, Arrakis <arrakistor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Howdy Roger,
> I thought the original question was asking about an alternative
> to torbutton.
> No plans to include torbutton in future versions of xB Browser.
> The reason we took it out is because it is counter-intuitive
> to user behaviors.
> Most users don't want a browser for both "anonymous" and "public"
> sessions. As an analogy, you may find people prefer to feed their
> dogs with different spoons than they themselves use, and it isn't
> for lack of a sanitizing dishwasher. So the user seems to prefer
> an entirely different disposable session, instead of
> "states" as provided by TorButton. Because our focus is user-
> oriented instead of design-oriented, elimination of TorButton was
> This conveys many benefits, not the least of which being one
> less point of failure and zero learning curve for the user. A
> greater benefit is that this promotes and enables concurrent
> browser usage so the user does not have to give up the browser
> they are used to. I feel this significantly increases the chance
> that the user will keep on employing a "secure" browser, rather
> than being faced with the choice between between having to integrate
> and learn something new, or turning off the "warning lights"
> and going back to insecure browsing habits. Wow, poor English.
> However, a significant distinction has to be made so the users
> do not confuse the "secure" browser with their normal browser,
> so we introduced the XeroBank Modern firefox theme, based on
> the defunct Netscape browser.
> More good news, though. At 6.7m download requests, I think we are
> now getting a strong idea of the user, and the appropriate threat
> model, so it may be time to start writing some papers that
> establish the evolutionary principles of xBB.