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- To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: UDP.
- From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 16 May 2006 19:26:57 -0400
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I saw some problems in the UDP proposal.
First, the keystream is the same for each consecutive UDP packet
except for the first and last byte and being shifted down once in
counter mode. CBC mode would stop that.
Secondly a TCP connection is being opened and unused. Why?
How does the exit node know what circuit the packets belong to?
Different source ports in outgoing UDP packets?
Will IGMP play nicely with Tor?
Some is just vagueness, some is security issues.
I think a statement in the docs saying CBC is the official cipher
mode of Tor would prevent future misuse of modes of operation.
"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."
-- Benjamin Franklin
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