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Re: a serious TOR adversary?
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Thus spake Bernardo Bacic, on 5/21/08 6:45 AM:
| This link http://web.crypto.cs.sunysb.edu/spday/ contains a summary
| description of a possible TOR threat.
| Does anyone have more details? opinions?
| (apologies if this has been discussed before, i read the list only as
| much as time permits)
"Although timing-based attacks have been demonstrated against
non-timing-preserving anonymity networks, they have depended either on a
global passive adversary or on the compromise of a substantial number of
Incorrect: Steven J. Murdoch. "Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by
their Clock Skew"; Nicholas Hopper, Eugene Y. Vasserman, and Eric
Chan-Tin. "How much anonymity does network latency leak?".
(Full disclosure: I'm one of the authors of the second paper).
"Furthermore, we show that a well-provisioned adversary, using a
topological map of the network, can trace-back the path of an anonymous
user in under 20 minutes."
Most Tor circuits only live a maximum of 10 minutes, no? I never figured
out just how much of hard limit this is. Can an application ask to keep
the circuit longer? Can someone in the know clue me in?
Eugene Y. Vasserman
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota
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