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Re: [tor-talk] A question about hidden services and tor in general



On 04/11/2013 3:24 AM, grarpamp wrote:
HS -> Guard -> Middle -> Middle -> Rendpoint <- Middle <- Guard <- Client
I hate to say it that gives me no confidence at all. Only the randomly
chosen guard at the HS end needs to be compromised and the whole chain
becomes worthless. A timing attack will reveal all.
I'd thought it trivial to time/packet/byte count and find the:
- HS, IF you ran both its guard and a client.
- Client, IF you ran both its guard and its destination
of choice (HS/[clearnet/exit]).
Yes
It depends on whether the guard has knowledge that some
of the streams going through its relay function are in fact
destined for a HS/client and not some other relay. I never
properly followed up on that question...

This knowledge is trivial to obtain, a timing attack isn't even necessary. Whether that represents a true risk I haven't yet determined. I need to consider what surety one can have that the guard is not compromised.

DC
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