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Re: SSL fro hidden services



Thanks guys for the speedy answers. I think I see now.
So there is not even one node which sees cleartext messages, not even the rendezvous point, because there is a DH handshake.
That means there is not really a need for another encryption layer.
And authentication of the hidden service doesn't make sense. You can already trust to be talking to this .onion, because you use its public key.
What would the benefit be that I can be sure to talk to some .onion.


Matthias Fischmann schrieb:

On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 09:26:59AM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:


To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: Paul Syverson <syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 09:26:59 -0400
Subject: Re: SSL fro hidden services

It's unnecessary. All communication is over Tor circuits that are



this claim is true under the assumption that tor doesn't have another bug that invalidates it, or will ever have.

especially if you use an ssl implementation for the hidden service
that is different from the one used by tor (openssl.org), you will
achieve higher *expected* security.  the additional workload of course
is quite high for this marginal gain, but that's matter of taste.

i believe that the overhead of double-ssl is shared between hidden
service and the tor client machine, and nodes won't notice the
difference.  (please correct me if i'm wrong.)

cheers,
matthias





created at both ends of the communication which are mated at an
Introduction Point to establish contact and at a Rendezvous Point to
pass data. So even the edges of the communication (between client and
Tor network, and between hidden server and Tor network) are multiply
encrypted.

-Paul

On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 09:22:18AM -0400, Dan Mahoney, System Admin wrote:


On Thu, 20 Oct 2005, Christian Beil wrote:



Is it possible to access hidden services using SSL? Does this make sense at all?


You can certainly use https, and port 443.

That said, the certificate naming scheme may be way off, since there's no concept of a valid certificate (I doubt verisign will want to sign one for 786237261871621.onion :)

However, assuming the user installs your self-signed cert, it *should* work the same unless there's something I'm missing.)

Of course, you're really just protecting content from being sniffed between the user and the entry node (usually, the same machine, but not always), and the exit node and the hidden service (presumably, you control both).

This is my understanding of it -- if someone has a better one please step on me without hesitation :)

-Dan

--

"One...plus two...plus one...plus one."

-Tim Curry, Clue

--------Dan Mahoney--------
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