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Re: [tor-talk] Another Tor is Possible, Kane/Ksec



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>> http://cryptome.org/2014/10/another-tor.pdf
> 
> The idea here is to make a "anonymity" network where it is possible to
> reveal any users IP if the majority of the relays in the network agree
> that this particular person should have their anonymity "revoked".
>
> You get to be "anonymous" until/unless "the majority" decides you should
> no longer be anonymous. "The majority" could simply mean "any adversary
> with the resources to run enough relays to be the majority.

I notice that the scheme also requires the directory servers to be the
folks that choose the random path that a message takes through the Tor
network.  This seems like a poorly thought out choice to me.  If a
directory turns out to be untrustworthy it could easily route a client
through a path that allows it to determine who the client is, what they
are sending, and to whom they are sending it.

This scheme in general gives a lot of power to the directory servers.

At least that is my reading of it.  I'm definitely no expert in this
topic.

Thank you,
Derric Atzrott
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