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Re: [tor-bugs] #2876 [Tor bundles/installation]: Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser



#2876: Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser
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 Reporter:  mikeperry                 |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new      
 Priority:  normal                    |      Milestone:           
Component:  Tor bundles/installation  |        Version:           
 Keywords:                            |         Parent:  #2871    
   Points:                            |   Actualpoints:           
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Comment(by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:3 mikeperry]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > > Round-to-the-nearest-N-msec would probably obfuscate better than add-a
 -random-delay.  (IOW, like a timed mix, but without reordering.)
 >
 > Yeah, probably. Then the fingerprinting code would always see only bins
 of dwell time and bins of flight time. Certainly easier to reason about
 how effective it is than some crazy probability distribution, at least.
 Ideally, we'd make the bin width such that they end up with uniform
 person-density in them, which means we'd need stats on the avg dwell and
 avg pairwise flight time.

 Actually, it may be that all bin-widths is well below what is a noticeable
 amount of delay, so maybe we need only one bin.

 Except, this makes me realize we're still going to break HTML5 games that
 use keyboard input. Or at least make people wonder why they suck so bad at
 them when using this privacy mode..

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2876#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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