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Re: [tor-bugs] #10286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Touch events leak absolute screen coordinates



#10286: Touch events leak absolute screen coordinates
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry                            |          Owner:
                                                 |  arthuredelstein
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,       |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, tbb-testcase, tbb-firefox-patch,     |
  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-7.0-must-alpha      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor4
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I have thought some more and I now think my reasoning in comment:24 is
 wrong. Some laptop/desktop users will be using a touch screen or stylus
 frequently, which means that two such sessions can be positively
 correlated. That means we have allowed some fingerprinting, even if a
 third session where the Touch API is not used cannot be positively linked
 to the first two.

 So now I am inclined to disable the Touch API altogether. Here's a new
 branch with 3 patches. The first simply disables the pref. The next two
 patches are the same as before (censoring the true screenX, etc.); the
 latter two are included as a possible defense in depth, in case the Touch
 API gets activated by the user or by us in the future, but those patches
 are not absolutely necessary.

 ​https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/10286+2

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10286#comment:25>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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