[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-bugs] #23097 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly



#23097: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly
--------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  dgoulet       |          Owner:
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High     |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok. I think the core problem is that the decision to build a "predicted
 circuit" for hidden services is actually independent from the per-port and
 internal prediction code. This is not the case for any other circuits
 launched from circuit_predict_and_launch_new().

 One option is to call rep_hist_note_used_internal() from the
 needs_hs_server_circuits() block in circuit_predict_and_launch_new(),
 since it seems like we always want to be predicting hidden service
 circuits continuously if an onion service is configured?

 Another option is to define a base minimum circuit idle timeout, and use
 it every single time in origin_circuit_new().

 Do we have a preference?

 (I'm also noticing that for prop247, we're going to want to change how
 circuit_predict_and_launch_new() works anyway, since we'll need to predict
 hidden service circuits with their specific purpose ahead of time, instead
 of just making CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL. Cannibalization is not going to
 work for us anymore).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23097#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs