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Re: [tor-bugs] #7202 [Tor]: Implement ntor handshake or its successor
#7202: Implement ntor handshake or its successor
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Reporter: karsten | Owner:
Type: project | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: SponsorZ tor-relay | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by mikeperry):
Ok, I think I've finished looking over the unit test in comparison to the
original paper. I think it all matches up now (aside from the dirauth
checking issue), but I have one nagging, basic question: Why do we
separately compute s.verify anymore now that we use rfc5869_sha256() to
derive our key material? Couldn't s.secret_input go directly into the Hmac
step and save us the verify hash, or is there additional future-proofing
against hash weaknesses hidden in this step?
I am asking for my own education rather than out of any argument to change
the protocol.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7202#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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